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[1055] 
Damages for Noneconomic Harm in Intellectual 
Property Law 
THOMAS F. COTTER† 
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of awards of “noneconomic” damages for 
reputational and emotional harm in intellectual property (IP) law, including trademarks, 
copyright and moral rights, the right of publicity, and patent law. The Article discusses, among 
other matters, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., affirming a 
$6.75 million award of statutory damages for the infringement of artists’ moral rights in graffiti 
art; the European Union’s Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive and its 2016 
Liffers decision, which appear to require member states to award, where warranted, 
noneconomic (“moral prejudice”) damages across the full range of IP cases; and some recent 
arguments in favor of awarding damages for emotional harm in, even, patent infringement 
actions. Prompted by these and other developments, I argue that courts should recognize 
reputational harm as a potentially cognizable injury throughout all of the branches of IP law but 
that damages for emotional harm should be limited to right of publicity and moral rights matters. 
In addition, I discuss the various options for providing monetary relief in response to 
noneconomic harm, including awards of general damages, statutory damages, disgorgement of 
the infringer’s profits, and enhanced or punitive damages; and I conclude with a set of 
recommendations for crafting awards in a manner that would both vindicate the relevant, 
cognizable interests of plaintiffs while reducing the risks of arbitrary, uncertain, and potentially 
overdeterrent relief.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Damages law in the United States sometimes draws a distinction between 
“economic” (or “pecuniary”) and “noneconomic” (“nonpecuniary”) harms (or 
“losses”).1 Although the terms are not always used consistently, across different 
jurisdictions or different bodies of law, economic harm is usually thought to 
comprise losses such as lost profits, lost wages, and expenses reasonably 
incurred to mitigate the consequences of the defendant’s conduct,2 whereas 
noneconomic harm includes (among other things) pain and suffering, emotional 
harm and other forms of mental distress, and loss of reputation.3 By most 
 
 1. For consistency, I will use the words “economic,” “noneconomic,” and “harm” in preference to 
“pecuniary,” “nonpecuniary,” and “loss,” except when quoting from a source that uses the alternate term. As the 
discussion below will show, the distinction between economic and noneconomic harm appears to come up most 
frequently in tort law, but it also sometimes arises in other settings, including contract and even criminal law. 
Because some sources use the word “injury” to denote harm or loss to a protected legal interest, I will avoid 
using it except in that context. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1315, 1329–30 (2003) (positing a possible distinction between injury and harm, but concluding that such 
“analytic typologies have their limits”). I also will use the term “damages” to refer to a remedy in the form of 
money, and (again) to avoid confusion will eschew use of the word “damage,” singular. For discussion of these 
semantic issues, see Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Nonmonetary Losses: An Integrated Answer to the 
Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 210–
11 (2009). Finally, sources sometimes classify punitive damages as a type of noneconomic damages. See, e.g., 
David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 80–83 (1997) 
(arguing against this classification). My focus here, however, will be on noneconomic damages for losses such 
as reputational and emotional harm, see infra note 3, and I will confine my discussion of punitive or enhanced 
damages to the question of whether these damages sometimes may indirectly vindicate these noneconomic 
interests. See infra Part III.B–D. 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
(defining “pecuniary harm” for purposes of establishing penalties for larceny as “harm that is monetary or that 
otherwise is readily measurable in money,” and as not including “emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other 
non-economic harm”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (including, as examples 
of compensation for pecuniary harm, damages for harm to property, harm to earning capacity, and the creation 
of liabilities). 
 3. At least five federal statutes, for example, define “noneconomic damages” or “noneconomic losses” in 
substantially identical terms. See 6 U.S.C. § 442(b)(2)(B) (defining “noneconomic damages” as “damages for 
losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, 
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, hedonic 
damages, injury to reputation, and any other nonpecuniary losses”); 20 U.S.C. § 7943(3) (“[P]hysical or 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of 
enjoyment of life, loss of society or companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), 
hedonic damages, injury to reputation, or any other nonpecuniary loss of any kind or nature.”); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 238q(e)(2)(B)(iii); id. § 247d-6d(e)(8); id. § 14505(3). 
   Similar definitions are sometimes found in state statutes, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. L. § 691.1416(f) 
(2020) (defining noneconomic damages as including “pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, 
disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury 
to reputation, humiliation, and other nonpecuniary damages”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 41.001(12) (West 
2021), and in other sources, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 & cmts. a–h (stating that 
“[d]amages for nonpecuniary harm are most frequently given in actions for bodily contact and harm to 
reputation,” and listing as examples of emotional distress humiliation, fear and anxiety, loss of companionship, 
loss of freedom, and “distress caused by mistreatment of a third person or of a corpse”). But see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (classifying “harm to market reputation” as a 
“pecuniary loss for which damages may be recovered” in a trademark action). For simplicity, this Article 
generally uses the term “emotional harm” as a shorthand that encompasses, among other things, emotional 
distress or mental anguish, feelings of humiliation or affront to dignity, loss of autonomy, and so on; and it 
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accounts, the distinguishing characteristic of economic harms is that they have 
some objective market value, an award of which restores the victim to the same 
financial position it would have occupied absent the defendant’s breach.4 
Noneconomic harms, by contrast, are those which do not have an objective 
market value, and for which a monetary award is never entirely restorative; put 
another way, these harms are in some sense incommensurable with financial 
losses.5 Damages for noneconomic harm, therefore, are not compensatory in the 
same sense as are damages for economic harm, but (when available) they 
provide some way of validating the plaintiff’s loss, and of forcing tortfeasors to 
internalize a greater share of the harm they cause.6  
The practical consequence of distinguishing economic from noneconomic 
harm is that, for certain types of claims, governing law either does not permit 
damages for noneconomic harms or does so only subject to certain conditions.7 
Initially, it might not seem surprising that the law would sometimes exclude or 
restrict recovery for a class of harms defined by their resistance to market 
valuation, though on further reflection this characteristic does not appear 
determinative. After all, not every economic harm caused by a defendant’s 
breach of duty is compensable either; doctrines such as proximate cause, the 
 
generally divides noneconomic damages into damages for reputational harm and damages for emotional harm 
so defined. I recognize, however, that the boundaries are not always clear. An affront to a person’s dignity or 
honor, for example, may cause the victim to suffer unpleasant internal mental phenomena as well as an external 
loss of standing within a community, which in turn may intensify or give rise to additional internal mental 
phenomena. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 
771 (1984) (after distinguishing four different ways in which a defamatory statement may harm reputation, 
further differentiating “the anguish that results from knowing the defamatory statement is in circulation” from 
“anger, hurt, or outrage” occurring “independently of any threat to reputation”); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of 
Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1424–25 (2011) (distinguishing between 
“reputational harm” as a disruption in the victim’s relationships with others resulting from a change in social 
attitudes toward the victim, and phenomena such as emotional distress, hurt feelings, and frustration of 
autonomy, which may accompany such harm); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on 
Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 841 (1985) (observing that the “main impetus for an action for invasion of 
privacy is not the emotional distress the invasion causes,” but rather the resulting indignity and humiliation); 
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
691, 693–719 (1986) (distinguishing among reputation as property, honor, and dignity). 
 4. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 3, at 780; Zavos, supra note 1, at 196–97. 
 5. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1, at 216 (3d ed. 2018); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981); Ingber, supra note 3, at 780; Robert 
L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 
359, 365 (2006); Zavos, supra note 1, at 196, 218–26. 
 6. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 3.1, at 216 (asserting that nonpecuniary damages provide “a 
sense of public sympathy and understanding for a grievously injured person,” and “set standards and provide 
incentives by adjudicating particular cases”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (“There is no 
direct correspondence between money and harm to the body, feelings or reputation.”); Ingber, supra note 3, at 
780–83 (noting that, even after receiving damages for pain and suffering, the tort “plaintiff continues to 
experience pain and suffering”); Rabin, supra note 5, at 361 n.8; Zavos, supra note 1, at 197, 243–50 (noting 
various posited rationales, including “reestablish[ing] the plaintiff’s self-confidence” and providing consolation, 
and proposing instead that noneconomic damages “symbolically affirm that the plaintiff has been wrongfully 
deprived of something of value”) (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of 
Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224 (1953)). 
 7. See infra Parts I, II. 
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economic loss doctrine, and the doctrine of antitrust injury all serve to limit 
recoveries for harms that courts consider to be too remote, unforeseeable, or as 
falling outside the class of harms for which a given body of law is intended to 
provide redress.8 At the same time, noneconomic harm sometimes results in 
quantifiable economic losses—a person suffering from emotional distress, for 
example, may incur out-of-pocket expenses to treat her condition; but if her 
distress is not a cognizable injury for the type of claim at issue, she’s out of luck, 
despite the relative ease of quantifying these losses in comparison with some of 
the economic losses for which damages routinely are awarded.9 The fact that 
harms that are easy to quantify nevertheless are sometimes subject to exclusion 
or restriction, while others that are notoriously difficult to quantify are not, 
suggests that the rationale for excluding or restricting recovery for noneconomic 
harms is only partly driven by quantification problems.10  
Be that as it may, the general rule at common law is that owners of real or 
personal property can recover only economic damages for invasions of their 
property rights,11 which might lead one to think that intellectual property (IP)12 
 
 8. See infra notes 271–278 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Ingber, supra note 3, at 779–80 (“[D]amages for lost future wages, often viewed as tangible, 
economic losses, are also uncertain and a matter of conjecture.”); cf. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs 
of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1286 n.516 
(1998) (“Many so called ‘economic’ losses . . . are actually nonpecuniary losses that can be readily measured.”) 
(citing Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages 
in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1857–62 (1995)). In intellectual property law in particular, U.S. courts 
for the most part deny any sort of relief for emotional harm, as we shall see—while routinely awarding 
reasonable royalties based on a “hypothetical,” that is, imaginary, pre-infringement negotiation. See Thomas F. 
Cotter, John M. Golden, Oskar Liivak, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse, Masabumi Suzuki & David O. 
Taylor, Reasonable Royalties, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 
6, 8, 22 (C. Bradford Biddle, Jorge L. Contreras, Brian J. Love & Norman V. Siebrasse eds. 2019) (discussing 
the semi-fictional character of reasonable royalties); Morris-Garner v. One Step Ltd. [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] 
AC 649 [91] (appeal taken from Eng.) (“There are certain circumstances,” including IP infringement, “in which 
the loss for which compensation is due is the economic value of the right which has been breached,” and that 
“[t]he imaginary negotiation is . . . a tool for arriving at that value”). 
 10. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 362 (“[S]etting one’s sights on the uncertain character of noneconomic loss 
creates an illusion that is simply inaccurate: that there is a sharp distinction between noneconomic and economic 
loss on the dimension of precision in valuation.”). 
 11. See, e.g., DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 5.6(2), at 530 (stating that, while courts sometimes award 
nonpecuniary damages in nuisance cases, they “usually compensate only for pecuniary losses when the tort 
physically harms the property or dispossess [sic] plaintiff” and not for emotional distress). There are, however, 
a variety of exceptions to this rule. See infra Part I. 
 12. Throughout this Article, I will use the term “intellectual property” or “IP” primarily to refer to the 
following five types of IP, in which the issues relevant to the Article are most likely to arise: (1) trademarks 
(exclusive rights in distinctive, nonfunctional symbols that identify unique products or services); (2) the right of 
publicity (a right to prevent the unauthorized use of one’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes 
of trade); (3) copyrights (exclusive rights in original works of authorship); (4) moral rights (additional rights, 
including rights of attribution and integrity, that subsist in certain works of authorship); and (5) utility patents 
(exclusive rights in novel, useful, and nonobvious inventions). Other IP rights, some of which I will refer to as 
the occasion warrants, include trade secrets (rights in secret commercial information), utility models (exclusive 
rights in minor innovations), and plant protection rights (plant patents). Further, although my principal focus is 
on U.S. law, from time to time I will draw upon examples from other countries to illustrate certain points; and 
the framework I provide in Part III for deciding whether (and if so, how) to award damages for certain types of 
injuries will, I hope, be of interest to legal actors in the United States and elsewhere. 
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is subject to a similar limitation.13 But the analogy doesn’t necessarily hold. 
Unlike real and personal property, certain bodies of IP law—trademarks, the 
right of publicity, and the “moral rights” branch of copyright in particular—are 
intended, in part, to protect the reputation of the rightsholder.14 As a result, 
courts in the United States have awarded damages to compensate for 
reputational injury in trademark and publicity cases (as well as the occasional 
copyright or patent case).15 Conventional wisdom nevertheless appears to be 
that, even when the plaintiff is a natural person, she cannot recover noneconomic 
damages for any emotional or mental distress attributable to the defendant’s 
infringement.16 By contrast, the European Communities’ 2004 Intellectual 
Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED) obligates member states of the 
European Union (E.U.) to award the prevailing plaintiff compensation not only 
for the “negative economic consequences,” such as lost profits resulting from 
infringement, but also for “appropriate cases of . . . moral prejudice.”17 The 
latter can include both reputational harm and mental anguish,18 and European 
courts have awarded such damages in copyright, trademark, and patent cases.19 
Some scholars have argued that U.S. courts should be more receptive to these 
types of claims than they currently are,20 though any such move would raise 
difficult legal and policy questions. 
 
 13. This is not to say that the analogy between IP and real or personal property is necessarily a very good 
one. In some respects it is, but in others it definitely isn’t. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part II.A–B, II.D. 
 15. See infra Part II.A–E. 
 16. See infra Part II. There are two exceptions, however. First, there is one federal moral rights case in 
which a court awarded a default judgment that included damages for emotional harm. See Hanrahan v. Ramirez, 
No. 2:97–CV–7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998); see also infra note 209 
(noting additional cases permitting such damages under Puerto Rico’s moral rights statute). Second, some courts 
have awarded damages for mental distress for violation of the right of publicity, without distinguishing the latter 
from the right of privacy. See infra notes 153–168 and accompanying text. 
 17. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13(1)(a), 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 23 (EC) [hereinafter IPRED]; 
see also Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection 
of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use 
and Disclosure, art. 14(2), 2016 O.J. (L 157/1) 1, 16 (EU) [hereinafter Trade Secrets Directive] (having identical 
language regarding trade secret misappropriation). 
 18. See Case C-280/15, Nikolajeva v. Multi Protect OÜ, ECLI:EU:C:2016:467, ¶¶ 20, 57 (June 22, 2016) 
(defining “moral prejudice” as including “mental suffering”); Case C-99/15, Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina 
SL, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, ¶ 17 (Mar. 17, 2016) (“[M]oral prejudice, such as damage to the reputation of the 
author of a work, constitutes . . . a component of the prejudice actually suffered by the rightholder.”); Nicholas 
Fox, Bas Berghuis, Ina vom Feld & Laura Orlando, Accounting for Differences: Damages and Profits in 
European Patent Infringement, 37 E.I.P.R. 566, 566–73 (2015) (citing case law from among the European Union 
member states variously including within the heading “moral prejudice” noneconomic harms comprising both 
mental distress and injury to reputation); cf. XAVIER SEUBA, THE GLOBAL REGIME FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 260–61 (2017) (distinguishing “moral prejudice,” which “is closely related to 
rights connected with the personality of the individual,” from “adverse effects on the reputation of a trademark” 
or to “the perception of the public towards the patented invention,” which are non-economic consequences but 
not “moral damages” as such). 
 19. See infra Part II.F. 
 20. See Ronen Avraham, Should Courts Award Pain and Suffering Damages in Patent Infringement 
Cases?, 26 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 215 (2018). 
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To illustrate, consider the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Castillo v. 
G&M Realty L.P.21 The plaintiffs were artists who used aerosol spray paint to 
create works of graffiti art.22 The defendants, a real estate developer and four of 
his corporations, permitted the artists to “tag” a building complex in Long Island 
City, New York, which the defendants owned and which became known in the 
arts community as “5Pointz.”23 Eventually, however, the defendants announced 
plans to demolish the buildings to make way for a condominium development, 
prompting the artists to file suit under a portion of the U.S. Copyright Act known 
as the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).24 VARA confers upon the authors of 
certain works of visual art a “moral right” of integrity consisting of the right “to 
prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . which 
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,” and “to prevent any 
destruction of a work of recognized stature.”25 After a motion for a preliminary 
injunction was denied, the defendants had the exterior of the buildings 
whitewashed, thus destroying most of the works at issue; the buildings 
themselves thereafter were demolished, as planned.26 At trial, the artists 
succeeded in proving that forty-five of the destroyed works had attained 
recognized stature,27 thus leaving the court to determine the appropriate damages 
to compensate them for their harm. But what exactly is the harm for which 
compensation is due in a case like Castillo? Is it the “economic” value of the 
destroyed works themselves? Or does it include the subjective mental distress 
that artists suffer when their works are destroyed or mutilated? Does the statute 
contemplate that artists should recover damages reflecting the objective harm to 
their “honor or reputation?” And how, exactly, would any of these harms be 
quantified?  
As it happened, the court ultimately decided not to award compensatory (or 
“actual”) damages but rather entered judgment for “statutory” damages in the 
amount of $150,000 per work—largely for deterrent, rather than compensatory 
purposes.28 This result may well have been justified on the facts of the case, but 
one might imagine other cases in which the need for deterrence is less salient, 
and compensation is the principal issue. In such settings, are statutory damages 
 
 21. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020). For discussion 
of the underlying facts, see Richard Chused, Moral Rights: The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz, 41 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 583 (2018). 
 22. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 162. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 162–63. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 26. See Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163. 
 27. Id. In their petition for certiorari, the Castillo defendants argued that the term “recognized stature” is 
unconstitutionally vague. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, G&M Realty L.P. v. Castillo, 141 S. Ct. 
363 (2020) (No. 20-66). 
 28. See Castillo, 950 F.3d at 164, 170–73. The Castillo defendants also argued in their certiorari petition 
that the damages award violates due process, both because the “recognized stature” criterion is vague and 
because the amount awarded is disproportionate to the offense. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
27, at 31–33. 
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a reasonable substitute for actual damages, and are there any guidelines that 
courts should follow in determining their amount? And when statutory damages 
are not an option—as they won’t be in most other IP contexts in the United 
States, or in most other countries—how should courts proceed in deciding what 
injuries (if any) are recoverable, and how should the amount of such awards be 
determined?   
I will argue that, in addressing these issues, courts and legislatures should 
focus on two related inquiries.29 The first, alluded to above, is whether harm to 
reputation or to psyche should qualify as a cognizable injury for the type of claim 
at issue.30 In this regard, I will argue that the purpose of the body of law at issue 
should be an important (in some cases, decisive) consideration. In particular, 
damages for reputational harm would seem appropriate (at least) for those bodies 
of IP law that are specifically intended to protect reputation (trademarks, 
privacy-based publicity rights, and moral rights), and damages for emotional 
distress for the latter two. By contrast, I will argue that awarding damages for 
emotional distress in patent or trademark cases, even when the proprietor is a 
natural person,31 would undermine the utilitarian thrust of these bodies of law, 
by elevating the interests of individual inventors or trademark proprietors above 
the public interest in innovation and competition.32 
Second, I will argue that measurement problems warrant caution in 
awarding noneconomic damages even when recovery otherwise would seem 
consistent with, or at least not clearly detrimental to, the purpose of the body of 
law in issue.33 In particular, I contend that courts should be free to award general 
 
 29. See infra Part III. Writing in the context of pain and suffering damages, Mark Geistfeld refers to these 
two inquiries as the “desirability” question and the “measurement” question. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price 
on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 773, 778 (1995). They are, of course, interrelated, since desirability, other than in the abstract, 
depends in part on the ease or difficulty of overcoming measurement problems. 
 30. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 31. Although U.S. patent applications traditionally have been filed in the name of the individual or 
individuals who claim to have invented the subject matter at issue, often the inventor assigns his or her patent to 
a corporation or other business entity; and since 2012 the assignee may file the application in its own name. See 
37 C.F.R. § 1.46(a) (2019). Artificial persons, such as corporations, do not experience emotion, and therefore 
under U.S. law would have no claim for damages for emotional distress even if such claims brought by individual 
inventors were cognizable. See, e.g., Osprey Cove Real Estate, LLC v. Towerview Constr., LLC, 808 S.E.2d 
425, 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (citing multiple authorities). The same would be true for other forms of IP, most 
of which are freely assignable under U.S. law—with the exception of moral rights and privacy-based rights of 
publicity, both of which may subsist only in individuals. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(b), (e)(1) (providing that moral 
rights vest in the author and are non-transferrable); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE 
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 10:3 (2d ed. 2020) (explaining that privacy-based rights of publicity are 
not assignable). 
 32. Copyright presents an ambiguous case. See infra notes 173, 301 and accompanying text. In addition, 
while awarding damages for reputational harm in patent or non-moral rights copyright cases would not, in my 
view, compromise the purpose of those bodies of law, I recommend not doing so except in cases involving 
willful infringement. See infra Part III.D. 
 33. See infra Part III.D. 
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damages34 to protect reputational interests in trademark infringement actions, 
and reputational and emotional harm in right of publicity and moral rights cases, 
but that such damages normally should be modest. I also recommend, however, 
that in cases involving willful or malicious infringement, courts should be 
allowed to award more substantial relief for cognizable noneconomic harm. 
Such relief may take the form of either general damages or, where applicable, 
the infringer’s profits, enhanced or punitive damages, or (as in Castillo) 
enhanced statutory damages. Finally, I propose a small set of factors, based on 
those applied in Castillo and other cases, to guide courts in setting an appropriate 
amount. In these ways, I will argue, courts can adequately vindicate the relevant 
interests of IP owners, while also reducing the risks that awards will be arbitrary 
and unpredictable, or threaten to deter lawful behavior or other countervailing 
interests. 
Part I discusses the practice of U.S. courts with regard to awards of 
noneconomic damages in two potentially analogous settings, specifically torts 
involving (1) real or personal property, and (2) invasions of intangible interests 
such as reputation and privacy. Part II then addresses the existing state of the 
law with regard to noneconomic damages in IP cases. Although Part II, like Part 
I, focuses principally on U.S. law, it also draws upon some recent developments 
within the E.U. to illustrate some other possible approaches if U.S. courts or 
legislatures were to consider modifying current practices. Part III draws upon 
the existing literature on noneconomic damages, most of it developed outside 
the context of IP law, for guidance in determining when (if ever) courts should 
award noneconomic damages for IP infringement. It also maps out the various 
options for structuring damages remedies, if such remedies are warranted, and 
recommends some changes to current practice.  
I.  DAMAGES FOR NONECONOMIC HARM OUTSIDE OF IP LAW 
As noted in the Introduction, courts and legislatures distinguish economic 
and noneconomic harm in a variety of circumstances. Exactly what counts as 
economic or noneconomic harm can sometimes vary, from one body of law or 
from one jurisdiction to another,35 though by and large the distinction is based 
 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 & cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979) (defining general damages 
as damages that do not need to be pled, and stating that “[i]n many cases in which there can be recovery for 
general damages, there need be no proof of the extent of the harm, since the existence of the harm may be 
assumed and its extent is inferred as a matter of common knowledge from the existence of the injury as described. 
In other cases, however, the existence of a particular harm must be proved, although it need not be specifically 
alleged”). 
 35. For example, as noted earlier, the Restatement of Unfair Competition classifies harm to a trademark 
owner’s reputation as an economic harm, while the Restatement of Torts and other authorities classify it as a 
noneconomic harm. See supra note 3. In wrongful death cases, loss of inheritance sometimes has been classified 
as pecuniary, sometimes as nonpecuniary, see John R. Hillsman, A Primer on Maritime Wrongful Death Law, 
26 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 81, 90–91 (2013); and while grief and mental anguish usually are considered nonpecuniary, 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 cmt. e, some jurisdictions take a more generous approach, see 
Emily J. Joselson, James M. Rodgers & Katherine B. Kramer, Opposing Defense Motions to Exclude Evidence 
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on the notion that money is an adequate substitute only for economic harm; and 
the distinction matters, because certain bodies of law make it more difficult, or 
impossible, to recover for noneconomic harms. For example, as a general rule 
victims of bodily injury torts can recover both economic and noneconomic 
damages,36 whereas damages for breach of contract usually are limited to 
economic damages.37 In addition, federal and state statutes sometimes cap the 
amount of damages that can be recovered for noneconomic harm, or exclude 
noneconomic damages altogether in certain classes of cases or for certain 
victims (for example, prison inmates).38 In other cases, tort victims can recover 
noneconomic damages only if they also demonstrate economic harm, as 
discussed below. 
Before considering the specifics of how courts have applied, or should 
apply, this distinction in IP cases, it might be useful to consider some other 
potentially analogous situations. First, since IP rights often are characterized as 
a form of property,39 one analogy would be to the law of real and personal 
property, where it is sometimes asserted that courts do not award damages for 
 
of Grief and Anguish in Wrongful Death Cases, 39 VT. L. REV. 1005 (2015) (discussing the Vermont Supreme 
Court’s classification of grief and mental anguish as pecuniary injuries). No doubt there are other examples. 
 36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 904 cmt. c, 905 & cmt. a, 924. 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 & cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Recovery for 
emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach 
is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result”; common examples of the 
latter “are contracts of carriers and innkeepers with passengers and guests, contracts for the carriage or proper 
disposition of dead bodies, and contracts for the delivery of messages concerning death.”). Some commentators 
have argued that the limitation is artificial. See, e.g., John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages 
in Actions Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
1565, 1653–54 (1986). 
 38. See, e.g., Zavos, supra note 1, at 195 n.1 (listing some examples). One of the examples listed, 
however—HAW. REV. STAT. § 663D-4 (2007)—has been repealed. 
 39. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets are a form of property); Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ 
is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act . . . .”); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of 
Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 558, 566–68 (1998) (arguing that, 
under the reasoning in Ruckelshaus, copyrights and trademarks also would qualify as property interests). 
Analogies to the law of real or personal property should not be overstated, however. For one thing, patents, 
copyrights, and publicity rights, unlike real and personal property, have a fixed duration. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) 
(patents); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04 (copyrights); Jennifer E. Rothman, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, 
LOY. L. SCH., https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (providing information on 
the duration of the right of publicity state-by-state). Unlike real and personal property, protection for trademarks 
can terminate if the owner fails to use the mark for a sufficient period of time, and protection for trade secrecy 
ends once the information is no longer secret. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (providing that there is a presumption of 
abandonment if trademark is not used for three years); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 
1985) (explaining that trade secrecy depends on, inter alia, the information not being generally known). 
Trademarks also cannot be assigned in gross or licensed without sufficient monitoring; moral rights cannot be 
transferred at all; and the Supreme Court has indicated that reputation itself is not a property interest. See Cotter, 
supra, at 566–68 (noting the preceding points). Further, in U.S. law the dominant rationale for patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks is that these rights are merely means to an end (of promoting invention, authorship, 
reducing consumer search costs, and so on)—see infra Part II.A–C, II.E—though, depending on one’s 
philosophical temperament, the same argument could be made for real and personal property. 
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noneconomic harm resulting from invasions of property interests.40 Relatedly, 
when courts award economic damages for the invasion of property interests, 
these damages are based on the property’s objective value, rather than any 
sentimental value the owner may attach to it.41 Both of these rules, however, 
need to be taken with a grain of salt. Many courts actually do allow damages for 
noneconomic harm, such as mental distress, resulting from intentional, 
malicious, or fraudulent invasions of real or personal property.42 Some courts 
have relaxed the rule even further by permitting plaintiffs to recover 
noneconomic damages in any conversion or trespass case in which they can 
prove that they suffered such harm;43 others have permitted the recovery of 
sentimental value for the loss of prized possessions, or noneconomic damages 
for negligent harm to property such as pets.44 To be sure, some of these decisions 
have proven controversial, and they have not been uniformly adopted.45 Their 
existence nevertheless suggests that permitting awards of noneconomic damages 
in some IP cases may not be as radical a suggestion as at first it might appear—
though, as we shall see, there may be good reasons for restricting such awards, 
even if one approves of a more liberal approach in other property cases.  
Second, since IP rights are intangible,46 another possible analogy would be 
to tort claims for the invasion of intangible interests such as reputation, privacy, 
 
 40. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 5.6(2), at 530 (noting, however, a relaxation of this rule in 
nuisance cases). Economic damages could include the diminution in market value of the property, the economic 
value suffered by reason of having been deprived of its use, the use value of the property, or the cost of repairs. 
See, e.g., id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 927–29. 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911 & cmt. e (noting that owners can recover, as economic 
damages, damages “peculiar to the user,” but not sentimental value); Edmonds v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 2d 
196, 202–03 (D.D.C. 2008); see also DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 5.14(2), at 587; Ingber, supra note 3, 
at 776–77. 
 42. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with Injury to or 
Interference with Tangible Property, 28 A.L.R.2d 1070, § 2 (1953 & Supp. 2019) (citing cases, and noting 
somewhat greater reluctance to award damages for mental distress “caused solely by [the owner’s] feeling for 
his property as such, and not by the violence or malice displayed by the defendant in committing the tort,” and 
in cases involving injury to chattels); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 927, 929 & cmt. e (stating 
that “[i]f the deprivation is the legal cause of harm to the feelings, damages may be allowable for the harm, as 
when the defendant intentionally deprives the plaintiff of essential household furniture, which humiliates the 
plaintiff, a result that the defendant should have realized would follow”; and that, for “harm to land resulting 
from a past invasion,” “[d]iscomfort and annoyance to an occupant of the land and to the members of the 
household are distinct grounds of compensation for which in ordinary cases the person in possession is allowed 
to recover in addition to the harm to his proprietary interests”); Ingber, supra note 3, at 776 n.15. 
 43. See Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 811–22 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 44. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 5.14(2), at 589–93 (discussing variations among jurisdictions); 
Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need to Preserve 
a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 227 (2006); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional 
Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R.5th 545 (2001 & Supp. 2017); cf. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. m (AM. L. INST. 2012) (“Recovery 
for emotional harm resulting from negligently caused harm to personal property is not permitted under this 
Section.”). 
 45. See sources cited supra notes 40–44. 
 46. As I have stated elsewhere:  
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and emotional well-being. Defamation law, for example, sometimes allows the 
trier of fact to award “general” damages for unquantifiable harm to the plaintiff’s 
reputation.47 More precisely, at common law all the plaintiff had to prove to 
prevail on a claim for written defamation (libel) was that the defendant published 
a defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff.48 Libel, in other words, 
was a strict liability tort; truth was a defense, rather than falsity being an element 
of the claim; and injury to reputation was (irrebuttably) presumed.49 Upon proof 
of liability, then, the jury could award “presumed” damages, that is, general 
damages to make up for the presumed injury to reputation.50 By contrast, for 
slander (oral defamation), courts would require proof of “special harm” (or 
“special damages”)—that is, economic losses resulting from the slanderous 
statement51—unless the statement fell into one of the four categories considered 
“slander per se.”52 In slander per se cases, as with libel, the jury could award 
presumed damages.53 Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,54 however, the 
Supreme Court has subjected defamation claims to varying levels of First 
Amendment scrutiny. As a result, courts now require defamation plaintiffs to 
prove fault,55 which in cases involving statements concerning public officials or 
public figures, or matters of public concern, means proof of actual malice—
 
A patent covers an invention in the sense of an inventive principle—something that can be 
embodied in tangible things such as machines or compounds, but which is defined exclusively by 
the scope of the patent grant. Similarly, copyright subsists in intangible works, such as strings of 
words or images, which can be embodied in tangible things such as books, film, computer files, 
and so on. 
THOMAS F. COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENTS IMPACT OUR DAILY LIVES 56 (2018). 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 48. See, e.g., Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and 
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353, 1356 n.23 (1975) (stating the above as a general rule, 
while noting some variations among states). 
 49. See id. at 1353. Some states required, however, that if the defamatory nature of the statement was not 
apparent on its face—that is, if the plaintiff had to prove extrinsic facts to show that the statement was 
defamatory—the plaintiff had to prove injury to her reputation and special damages. See id. at 1354–56; see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b; Richard J. Conviser & Roger W. Meslar, Obsolete on Its Face: 
The Libel Per Quod Rule, 45 ARK. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (1992). 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a; Conviser & Meslar, supra note 49, at 9–10; 
Eaton, supra note 48, at 1354. 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 622; Conviser & Meslar, supra note 49, at 9; Eaton, supra 
note 48, at 1354–56; cf. Anderson, supra note 3, at 759–60 (noting that courts have not always equated special 
damages with actual injury). On the sometimes murky distinction between libel and slander, see, for example, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 568, 568A. 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 570 (defining slander per se as involving defamatory 
statements imputing “a criminal offense,” “a loathsome disease,” “matter incompatible with [the victim’s] 
business, trade, profession, or office,” or “serious sexual misconduct”); Conviser & Meslar, supra note 49, at 8–
9; Eaton, supra note 48, at 1354–55. 
 53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 622; Conviser & Meslar, supra note 49, at 9; Eaton, supra 
note 48, at 1354–55. 
 54. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 55. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B; 
cf. Conviser & Meslar, supra note 49, at 3 n.6 (noting that the Supreme Court has not conclusively resolved the 
question of whether the First Amendment requires private plaintiffs to prove fault in cases against non-media 
defendants, in cases in which the defamation involves matters that are not of public concern). 
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publishing the statement with knowledge that it is false and defamatory, or with 
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity56—by clear and convincing evidence 
subject to de novo review on appeal.57 In addition, presumed damages are 
permitted only in cases in which the plaintiff proves actual malice, or in which 
(1) the defendant is not a public official or public figure, and (2) the statement 
does not involve a matter of public concern.58 Juries are still allowed, however, 
to award general damages, as long as the plaintiff offers some evidence of actual 
injury.59 These general damages do not have to be tied to any specific, 
quantifiable loss, such as lost wages, but rather can be based on evidence such 
as loss of standing in the community.60 Further, in libel and slander per se cases, 
plaintiffs also may recover damages for any special harm they are able to 
prove.61  
The complexities of the common law system are hard to defend as a matter 
of policy and are mostly the result of historic accident.62 Even so, the rules for 
awarding damages, as modified by the Supreme Court, are not entirely irrational. 
Given that injury to reputation can manifest itself in ways that are not easily 
susceptible to quantification, for example, allowing the trier of fact to award 
general damages for libel and slander per se arguably makes sense, since 
otherwise the plaintiff might have no effective redress for injury to the very 
interest the body of law is intended to protect.63 The drawback, of course, is that 
awards of general damages can appear arbitrary and inconsistent from one case 
to another; this possibility in turn risks subjecting unpopular defendants to 
ruinous liability, and the risk of error in applying the law can over-deter (chill) 
some potential defendants from engaging in lawful conduct (for example, 
publishing news about matters of public concern). The current overlay of First 
 
 56. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (explaining that private plaintiffs bear 
the burden of proving falsity and fault in defamation cases involving matters of public concern); Gertz, 418 U.S. 
at 342 (“Those who . . . are properly classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may 
recover for injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with 
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 57. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498–511 (1984). 
 58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–51; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757–
61 (1985) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.); Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1492, 1494 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court “has limited the right to recover presumed 
damages in defamation suits by public officials, public figures, and private persons involved in public issues to 
cases where they prove actual malice,” while leaving “states substantial latitude in deciding whether to retain, 
modify, or eliminate the presumed damages rule in cases where there are no First Amendment limitations”). 
 59. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349–50. 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. b (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350). 
 61. See id. § 623. 
 62. See id. § 568 cmt. b. 
 63. By contrast, statements that are not per se defamatory might be expected to have less of an impact on 
reputation, in which case requiring proof of special damages might seem justified—though, as critics point out, 
this justification may be outmoded in a world in which oral statements can reach a wide audience via 
broadcasting. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 751; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (defining the 
broadcasting of defamatory content by television and radio as libel); Conviser & Meslar, supra note 49, at 25 
(noting that some states do not require proof of special damages for slander per quod). 
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Amendment protection is intended to mitigate these risks by making it more 
difficult to find liability in the first place and by taking presumed damages off 
the table altogether in certain cases—though as critics point out, the law still 
permits presumed damages in cases involving actual malice, which means any 
case successfully litigated by a public official or public figure.64 Further, states 
remain free to define the “actual injury” necessary to sustain an award of general, 
non-presumed damages as consisting of mental anguish alone,65 which raises 
two problems. The first is that, even when presumed damages are unavailable, 
plaintiffs sometimes can succeed in proving defamation even though they offer 
no evidence of actual harm to their reputations.66 Second, and relatedly, they 
may be able to circumvent the limitations on liability imposed by the stand-alone 
torts of infliction of emotional distress, discussed below.67 For these reasons, the 
better rule (followed in some states) is to require the plaintiff to prove some harm 
to reputation as a prerequisite to allowing recovery, as so-called “parasitic” 
damages, of any further damages for emotional distress.68 
Other bodies of law that protect a person’s interest in reputation or 
emotional health tend to be less complicated than defamation law. The law of 
injurious falsehood,69 for example, protects a person’s interest in the reputation 
of her goods, services, or property;70 but, because the common law courts 
viewed this reputational interest as being of lesser magnitude than personal 
reputation, this body of law protects only the plaintiff’s pecuniary interest.71 
Specifically, subject to some variations among jurisdictions, the claimant must 
prove that the defendant intentionally made a false and disparaging statement, 
of and concerning the plaintiff’s goods, services, or property, thus causing the 
plaintiff to suffer special harm (for example, in the form of lost profits on 
diverted sales).72 Thus, not only is harm to reputation not presumed, but the only 
 
 64. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 756. 
 65. See id. at 756–68 (first citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350; and then citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 
448, 460–61 (1976)). 
 66. See id. at 757–58. 
 67. See id. at 760–61. 
 68. See id. at 762–63; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 cmt. a. 
 69. Depending on exactly what is being disparaged, it also goes by several additional names, including 
trade libel, product disparagement, and commercial disparagement. See BARTON BEEBE, THOMAS F. COTTER, 
MARK A. LEMLEY, PETER S. MENELL & ROBERT P. MERGES, TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND 
BUSINESS TORTS 543 (2d ed. 2016). Further, some disparagement claims today are litigated as a type of false 
advertising claim. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
 70. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1259 (D. Mass. 1981) 
(“Defamation of a corporation injures the reputation of the corporation itself, while product disparagement 
injures the reputation of its products.”) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), 
aff’d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
 71. See BEEBE ET AL., supra note 69, at 543–44. 
 72. The more expansive “injurious falsehood” tort, recognized in some states, does not require proof that 
the statement was “of and concerning the plaintiff’s goods, services, or property.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 623A. In addition, some jurisdictions require proof of actual malice in all or some cases, while in others 
malice is presumed upon proof of the other elements. See BEEBE ET AL., supra note 69, at 547–48. 
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type of damages recoverable are economic damages for actual, quantifiable 
losses.73  
Violations of common-law privacy claims, by contrast, sometimes result 
only in mental distress in the form of humiliation or loss of dignity, for which 
general, noneconomic damages might be the only effective remedy.74 Courts and 
commentators typically divide these claims into four distinct torts: intrusion 
upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation 
of name or likeness.75 For violations of any of them, the plaintiff may recover, 
as appropriate, general damages for “the harm to his interest in privacy resulting 
from the invasion,” “mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a 
kind that normally results from such an invasion,” and harm to reputation.76 In 
addition, the plaintiff may recover compensation for “special damage of which 
 
 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633. These losses would include lost profits on sales that 
would have been made, but for the disparagement, and expenses reasonably incurred to counteract the 
disparagement. See id. § 633 & cmts. c–g. The rule is relaxed to some extent if the plaintiff can show a drop-off 
in business following the disparagement, and with reasonable certainty can eliminate other causal factors. See 
id. § 633 cmt. h, illus. 1; BEEBE ET AL., supra note 69, at 547. According to the Restatement, however, there is 
no recovery for consequential damages, such as “loss resulting from the plaintiff’s failure to make an 
advantageous use of money that he would have made if a prospective sale had been consummated,” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633 cmt. i, or for emotional harm. See id. § 633 cmt. j (“[C]ontrary to the 
rule applicable in actions of defamation, emotional distress and resulting harm may not in an action for injurious 
falsehood be taken into account as an element of damage that the jury may consider in determining the amount 
recoverable, even when there is such pecuniary loss as to make the publication of the injurious matter 
actionable”). Under some circumstances, however, this restriction may be mitigated by the possibility that a 
given statement might give rise to claims for both injurious falsehood and personal defamation. See id. § 623A 
cmt. g (stating that, if a statement implies “that the plaintiff is dishonest or lacking in integrity or that he is 
perpetrating a fraud upon the public by selling something that he knows to be defective, the personal defamation 
may be found. In this case, it is common to sue in defamation because the damages are more comprehensive. 
Action may be brought in the same suit for both torts, however, so long as the damages are not duplicated.”). 
Whether injurious falsehood claims, like defamation claims, merit heightened First Amendment scrutiny, is a 
matter that has divided courts and commentators. See BEEBE ET AL., supra note 69, at 617–19. 
  By contrast, in an action for tortious interference with contract or with prospective contractual relations, 
the plaintiff must prove pecuniary loss, but having done so also may recover for harm to reputation or emotional 
distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A; Heymann, supra note 3, at 1415. 
 74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H cmt. b (stating that a plaintiff may “recover damages 
for emotional distress or personal humiliation”); Ingber, supra note 3, at 841–42 (stating the same for “indignity 
and humiliation”); see also Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 770–73 (2018) (arguing, inter alia, that, because courts have long awarded 
damages for emotional harm in common-law privacy cases, they should recognize emotional distress resulting 
from a data breach as a cognizable injury, sufficient to establish standing to sue in federal court). 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (“The right of privacy is invaded by (a) 
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s 
name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in 
§ 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.”). 
This division was proposed by William L. Prosser in his article Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H & cmt. a. Comment a specifically notes that public 
disclosure of private facts and false light may impact the plaintiff’s reputation, but one can readily imagine 
scenarios in which the appropriation of another’s name or likeness could do so as well—for example, by falsely 
associating the subject with a noxious product; by making her appear greedy, or in need of money; or by making 
her appear hypocritical for endorsing a product she has publicly disapproved of, or by going back on her word 
never to endorse products at all. See Heymann, supra note 3, at 1341, 1391–93, 1409–10. For discussion in 
connection with the right of publicity, see infra Part II. 
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the invasion has been the legal cause,” if she can prove this harm with reasonable 
certainty.77  
Finally, there are a few bodies of law in which mental distress, standing 
alone, qualifies as a cognizable injury for which damages may be awarded.78 
The most obvious example is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, which occurs when a person “by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to another.”79 For 
violation of this tort, the prevailing plaintiff may recover an award of general 
damages, as well as (where substantiated) economic damages for specific losses 
such as therapist bills.80 Both emotional distress and privacy claims, however, 
can risk chilling protected speech under some circumstances, and thus, like 
defamation claims, are subject to some degree of First Amendment scrutiny.81  
II.  NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN IP LAW 
This Part addresses the existing law on noneconomic damages for the 
infringement of IP rights. Subparts A and B discuss, respectively, the two bodies 
of IP law, trademarks and the right of publicity, in which U.S. courts to date 
 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H & cmt. d. For the appropriation tort, relief could include 
compensation “for the loss of the exclusive use of the value so appropriated,” id. § 652H cmt. a, or the “restitution 
of benefits tortiously obtained,” id. § 652H cmt. e, both of which overlap with the remedies potentially available 
for violation of the right of publicity. See infra Part II. 
 78. These include, in addition to the emotional distress torts discussed above, such common law torts as 
assault, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, as well as certain civil rights and consumer protection 
laws. See, e.g., Nunes v. Rushton, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1228–29 (D. Utah 2018) (discussing the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Fair Housing Act); DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 5, 
§§ 7.3(1)–(2), 7.4(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 670; Rabin, supra note 5, at 362–73. Moreover, 
shortly before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court held that courts may award nominal damages to 
compensate civil rights plaintiffs for past harms suffered. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, No. 19-968, 2021 
WL 850106, at *2 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2021). 
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. L. INST. 
2012); see also id. § 47 & cmt. b (stating that one “whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to 
another is subject to liability to the other if the conduct (a) places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm 
and the emotional harm results from the danger; or (b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, 
undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm,” 
such as “negligently mishandling a corpse”); id. § 45 (defining emotional harm as “impairment or injury to a 
person’s emotional tranquility); id. § 48 (discussing liability to bystanders). 
 80. See, e.g., George Grubbs Enters., Inc. v. Bien, 881 S.W.2d 843, 858–59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (listing 
recoverable compensatory damages as “medical/rehabilitation,” “lost earning capacity,” “physical symptoms,” 
“emotional injury,” and “loss of society”), rev’d on other grounds, 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1995). 
 81. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–61 (2011) (holding that there is no liability for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion, where defendant’s speech involves a matter of public 
concern); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (holding that there is no liability for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, absent actual malice, where the plaintiff is a public figure); Cantrell 
v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249–50 (1974) (holding that there is no liability for false light invasion 
of privacy, absent actual malice, where defendant’s speech involves a matter of public concern); Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967). In a case involving a media defendant’s public disclosure of private facts, 
the Court has required the claimant to prove that the state law is narrowly tailored to achieve a state interest “of 
the highest order.” See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 
526–35 (2001) (holding that a statute forbidding the innocent disclosure of information of public concern 
obtained by another from illegal wiretaps was an unconstitutional regulation of pure speech). 
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have been most likely to award damages for reputational harm; Subpart B also 
shows how courts occasionally have awarded damages for mental distress in 
some hybrid right of publicity/right of privacy matters. Subparts C, D, and E 
discuss, respectively, the approaches taken in U.S. copyright, moral rights, and 
patent cases. Subpart F presents, by way of comparison, a brief discussion of the 
somewhat greater receptivity of courts within the E.U. to claims for 
noneconomic harm (“moral prejudice”) across the spectrum of IP rights.  
A. TRADEMARKS 
A trademark is a symbol that identifies a unique product or service.82 
Although the most common example of a trademark is a brand name (for 
example, APPLE computers), trademark rights can subsist in just about anything 
else, as long as it is sufficiently distinctive83 and nonfunctional,84 including 
numbers, pictures, initials, slogans, colors, sounds, scents, product packaging, 
and product configuration.85 
Trademark infringement consists of the commercial use of a symbol that is 
likely to confuse consumers as to the source or affiliation of the products or 
services marketed by either the infringer or the trademark owner.86 Sometimes 
trademark infringement involves outright counterfeiting—for example, 
stamping the GUCCI name on faux-GUCCI handbags—though usually it’s not 
quite so blatant. If someone were to begin marketing a sports drink called 
POWERAID, for example, the Coca-Cola Company (owner of the registered 
trademark POWERADE for sports drinks87) would be able to shut them down 
because the similarity of the words and products virtually guarantees that 
consumers would be likely to confuse POWERAID with the familiar 
POWERADE. If instead the words or products were not quite so similar—say, 
POWERUP for a candy bar—the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) or a court would apply the so-called “digits of confusion” to determine 
 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 
(AM. L. INST. 1995). 
 83. Some symbols, including fanciful words such as XEROX, are considered inherently distinctive, while 
others (including such descriptive terms as AMERICAN) are non-inherently distinctive. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 13 & cmt. c, 14. Under U.S. law, a person acquires trademarks rights in 
inherently distinctive symbols through use, whereas non-inherently distinctive symbols require proof of acquired 
distinctiveness (secondary meaning). See id. §§ 13, 18. Federal registration of a mark effectively confers 
nationwide rights. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1072, 1115. 
 84. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (“‘A product feature is 
functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,’ 
that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”) (quoting Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (“A design is ‘functional’ . . . if the design affords benefits 
in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with which the design is used, apart from any 
benefits attributable to the design’s significance as an indication of source, that are important to effective 
competition by others and that are not practically available through the use of alternative designs.”). 
 85. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. g.  
 86. See id. § 20. 
 87. See POWERADE, Registration No. 1832856. 
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whether a substantial number of the relevant class of consumers likely would be 
confused.88 Modern-day trademark law, moreover, is understood to cover not 
only direct confusion occurring at the point-of-sale (as in the examples above)—
a tort known at common law as “passing off” or “palming off”89—but also, under 
some circumstances, other types of confusion. These include reverse confusion 
(for example, where a big company swamps the market with a product bearing 
a mark confusingly similar to an existing, but little-known mark);90 confusion as 
to sponsorship or endorsement (which can enable trademark owners to lay claim 
to related, and sometimes not so related, product or service markets);91 initial 
interest confusion (as when a firm uses another’s mark, say in an internet 
keyword ad, to draw attention to its own products, but confusion is dissipated at 
the point of sale);92 and post-sale confusion (which might occur, for example, 
where the purchaser of the fake GUCCI bag knows it’s a fake, but the person to 
whom she gives it as a gift does not).93  
In addition, trademark law confers upon the owners of “famous” marks the 
right to prevent even non-confusing uses that are likely to cause “dilution.”94 
 
 88. A standard list of the digits of confusion includes: 
1. The degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations;  
2. The similarity of the marketing methods and channels of distribution;  
3. The characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of care they exercise;  
4. The degree of distinctiveness of the senior user’s mark;  
5. Where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood that prospective buyers would 
expect the senior user to expand into the field of the junior user;  
6. Where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the extent to which the senior user’s 
designation is known in the junior user’s territory;  
7. The intent of the junior user; and  
8. Evidence of actual confusion. 
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:29 (5th ed. 2019) 
(paraphrasing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 20–23). In percentage terms, a substantial 
plurality can be twenty-five percent or less, based on survey evidence. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra, § 32:185. 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 1 cmt. f, 4 & cmt. b.  
 90. See id. § 20 cmt. f; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 23:10. 
 91. For example, pancake flour and syrup, see Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 408–
10 (2d Cir. 1917), or locks and flashlights, see Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
Contemporary trademark law has moved far beyond such foundational cases, however, by extending the 
sponsorship rationale to cover, for example, unauthorized celebrity endorsements, see infra Part II.B, and the 
sale of clothing bearing a sports team logo. For discussion of the latter and citations to relevant case law, see, 
for example, 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 24:12; Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept 
of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 555, 614–16 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 468–71 (2005); Mark A. 
Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 438 (2010). 
 92. For discussions and citations to relevant case law, see, for example, 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, 
§ 23:6; Bone, supra note 91, at 612–14; Heymann, supra note 3, at 1394–95. 
 93. For discussions and citations to relevant case law, see, for example, 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, 
§ 23:7; Bone, supra note 91, at 607–12; Heymann, supra note 3, at 1393–94. 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another 
person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in 
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless 
of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”); id. 
April 2021] DAMAGES FOR NONECONOMIC HARM IN IP LAW 1073 
The two principal circumstances in which this may occur are when the use 
threatens to impair (“blur”) the mark’s distinctiveness (for example, ADIDAS 
peanut butter),95 or when it threatens to tarnish the mark, for example by giving 
it an unsavory connotation (for example, ADULTS-R-US for a pornographic 
site).96 By most accounts, the purpose of antidilution law is to prevent such uses 
because they threaten to reduce the famous mark’s “commercial value or ‘selling 
power.’”97 
Modern trademark scholarship posits that trademarks perform what is 
sometimes referred to as an “information transmission”98 function, by enabling 
consumers more easily to locate the products they want—to lower their search 
costs, in economic parlance. This diminution in search costs can result either 
from consumers’ own past experience with products bearing the mark, or their 
perception of others’ collective judgment regarding those products (that is, the 
 
§ 1125(c)(2)(A) (defining “famous” as “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States 
as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner,” and setting out relevant factors for 
establishing fame); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1) (“One may be subject to liability 
under the law of trademarks for the use of a designation that resembles the trademark, trade name, collective 
mark, or certification mark of another without proof of a likelihood of confusion only under an applicable 
antidilution statute.”). Many states also have enacted antidilution statutes, though the federal statute bars state 
law dilution claims brought against owners of federally registered marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6). The federal 
statute also admits of several exceptions, including fair use, news reporting, and noncommercial use. See id. § 
1125(c)(3). 
 95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (defining “dilution by blurring” as “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark,” 
and setting out relevant factors to determine whether blurring is likely); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25(1) (“An actor is subject to liability under an antidilution statute if the actor uses such a 
designation in a manner that is likely to associate the other’s mark with the goods, services, or business of the 
actor and . . . (a) the other’s mark is highly distinctive and the association of the mark with the actor’s goods, 
services, or business is likely to cause a reduction in that distinctiveness . . . .”). 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defining “dilution by tarnishment” as “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1) (“An actor is subject to liability under an antidilution 
statute if the actor uses such a designation in a manner that is likely to associate the other’s mark with the goods, 
services, or business of the actor and . . . (b) the association of the other’s mark with the actor’s goods, services, 
or business, or the nature of the actor’s use, is likely to disparage the other’s goods, services, or business or 
tarnish the images associated with the other’s mark.”). The ADULTS-R-US example is drawn from Toys “R” 
Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381 CW, 1996 WL 772709, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmts. a, c; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 
88, §§ 24:73, 24:92; Stacey L. Dogan, What Is Dilution, Anyway?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 103, 
104–07 (2006); Thomas R. Lee, Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859, 867–68 (2004). So stated, the 
question arises why trademark law should protect the famous mark’s commercial value and selling power. 
Among the possible justifications, all of them contestable, are that owners have a moral entitlement to prevent 
injury to or free-riding upon their goodwill; that dilution increases consumer search costs or mental exertion, if 
only by a little, or otherwise causes consumers emotional harm; and that dilution interferes with consumers’ 
ability to signal their status by preserving the exclusivity of luxury goods. For discussion, see, for example, 
Bone, supra note 91, at 605–06, 616–21; Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227 (2008); Dogan, supra, at 104; cf. Lee, supra, at 887–88, 897 (arguing that the 
harm caused by dilution is the increase in search costs/mental exertion, and that the reduction in selling power 
is only a possible collateral consequence of this harm). 
 98. See Bone, supra note 91, at 549, 555. 
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products’ reputation).99 The relationship between trademarks and reputation, 
moreover, is implicit in the common assertion that trademarks symbolize a 
product’s “goodwill,”100 a concept denoting, more or less, an “expectancy of 
continued patronage.”101 Some commentators go so far as to equate goodwill 
with reputation,102 though it’s probably more accurate to think of reputation as 
one of goodwill’s constituent elements, as reflected in the following definition 
of goodwill—originally proposed by Joseph Story—which courts have 
continued to cite with favor: 
[T]he advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the 
mere value of the capital stock, funds, or property employed therein, in 
consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it 
receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, 
or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or 
from other practical circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient 
partialities, or prejudices.103 
Some, but not all, of the conduct that contemporary trademark law 
condemns can impact a product’s reputation. To illustrate, suppose that a 
consumer (call her Neve) has certain positive expectations about POWERADE, 
based either on her own experience consuming it or what she’s heard about it 
from friends (its reputation).104 Now suppose that Neve intends to buy a bottle 
of POWERADE but mistakenly purchases POWERAID instead, and finds that 
 
 99. See id. at 555–56 (noting, in addition, that trademark protection provides an incentive for producers to 
maintain a consistent level of quality in their branded products, so that the mark retains its information 
transmission function, and that it protects consumers against deception); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c; Heymann, supra note 3, at 1385. 
 100. See, e.g., Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc., 920 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2019); 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 2:15. 
 101. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1993) (citing Boe v. Comm’r, 
307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)). 
 102. See Gvantsa Gugeshashvili, Is Goodwill Synonymous with Reputation?, 16 JURIDICA INT’L 126, 127–
28 (2009) (noting that “goodwill and reputation are very often considered to be synonyms,” but that goodwill is 
the broader concept in common law countries); Heymann, supra note 3, at 1355 & n.46 (citing Odek Shenkar & 
Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Reputation, Image, Prestige, and Goodwill: An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Organizational Standing, 50 HUM. REL. 1361, 1361 (1997)). 
 103. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 99, at 139 (1841), quoted in United 
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 849 n.5 (1996). For other formulations, see, for example, Newark Morning 
Ledger, 507 U.S. at 555–56 (citing, in addition to Justice Story’s and the Boe court’s definitions, judicial 
definitions of goodwill as “that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of 
customers, arising from an established and well-known and well-conducted business” and “the total of all the 
imponderable qualities that attract customers to the business”) (citations omitted); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, 
§§ 2:17–19 (citing various definitions); Bone, supra note 91, at 568–72, 583–84; Heymann, supra note 3, at 
1355–56 (suggesting that goodwill is evidence of reputation). Bone further distinguishes among brand goodwill 
(“positive information consumers have about a specific brand, such as its reliability, high quality, and the like”); 
firm goodwill (“positive impressions of the firm that sells the brand”); inherent goodwill (“goodwill subsisting 
in the mark itself,” such that it imparts meanings of luxury or prestige “to any product or firm with which it is 
associated”); and product goodwill (for example, an attractive feature of a product that also serves a source-
identifying function). Bone, supra note 91, at 551–52, 552 n.11. 
 104. She also may know, or thinks she knows, something about the drink from advertising, or just from 
seeing other people consume it (for example, that it’s popular, that they seem to enjoy it, and so on). 
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she doesn’t like the taste. There are at least three possible ways in which Neve, 
Coca-Cola, and third parties may be affected. First, and most obviously, Neve is 
worse off because she was deceived into buying the wrong product, and Coca-
Cola has lost a sale it otherwise would have made. Second, unless Neve comes 
to realize her mistake after the fact, her disappointment with POWERAID might 
make her less likely to buy genuine POWERADE in the future, which 
aggravates both her and Coca-Cola’s harm. Third, if she tells other people about 
her bad experience, the injury is further compounded, to the extent others refrain 
from buying POWERADE based on Neve’s misattribution of her bad experience 
to POWERADE. In all three of these examples, Neve and Coca-Cola have been 
harmed by an act of infringement that both compromised the mark’s information 
transmission function and negatively impacted its goodwill—the latter because, 
at the very least, Neve herself is less likely to buy POWERADE again. Only in 
the third scenario, however, has the mark potentially suffered reputational 
harm—though to the extent other consumers are likely to make the same mistake 
as Neve, the probability of reputational harm may be substantial.105 Further, to 
the extent reputation can be a useful heuristic—third parties rely on reputation 
to save themselves the trouble of acquiring information about a product (or a 
person) more directly—preventing this potential injury to Coca-Cola’s 
reputation coincides with the public interest as well.  
In actuality, though, contemporary trademark law doesn’t require proof 
that anyone actually has been confused, or even that consumers are likely to rely 
on the potentially misleading name to their detriment; all that is required is a 
likelihood of confusion, period. Such a standard might make sense in a case like 
the one above, because it is highly probable that, given the similarity of the 
words and the products, sales of a sports drink called POWERAID would (1) 
compromise POWERADE’s information transmission function, (2) cause some 
consumers to buy the wrong product, and (3) pose substantial risk of injury to 
POWERADE’s reputation and goodwill. Dispensing with the requirement to 
show actual confusion or reliance, therefore, conserves adjudication costs 
without materially increasing the risk of error.106  
The further we travel from such “core” cases, however, the more tenuous 
the preceding harms become—and the more it can seem that courts are willing 
to protect owners against any sort of free riding on their goodwill, regardless of 
whether such conduct actually diminishes the mark’s ability to transmit 
information, deceives consumers into buying products they don’t want, or 
causes harm to the mark’s reputation or goodwill.107 Consider, for example, the 
 
 105. See Heymann, supra note 3, at 1387. 
 106. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 91, at 445–46 (arguing that courts should presume that confusion 
is material—that consumers rely to their detriment—only in cases of direct confusion as to source, and should 
require proof of materiality in other cases). 
 107. See Bone, supra note 91, at 603–15. As Bone argues, this protection against free riding, regardless of 
whether it results in any of the above harms, is difficult to square with the traditional rationales for U.S. 
trademark law, and it potentially imposes social costs by inhibiting competition and free speech. See id. at 616–
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so-called merchandising right that many courts now seem willing to 
recognize.108 In particular, suppose that a third-party manufacturer, without 
Coca-Cola’s authorization, makes and sells gym bags bearing the word 
POWERADE, and that Neve buys one. It is theoretically possible, in this 
scenario, that (1) Neve believes, at the point of sale, that the owner of the mark 
authorized the use (sports drinks and gym bags not being altogether unrelated); 
(2) she relied upon that belief as a reason to buy the bag; (3) the bag falls apart 
in a short time, or otherwise disappoints; (4) as a result of this disappointing 
experience, Neve vows never to buy any POWERADE merchandise again; and 
(5) also as a result of her experience, she vows never to buy any POWERADE 
sports drinks again either. The probability that all five conditions are present 
nevertheless is surely less than one (indeed, it may be pretty close to zero).109 
Moreover, unless conditions (4) or (5) are present, the unauthorized use of the 
name cannot possibly affect Coca-Cola’s goodwill; and even if conditions (4) or 
(5) are present, there’s no reputational harm unless (6) Neve shares her 
experience with others, (7) they believe her, and (8) their behavior toward 
POWERADE merchandise or sports drinks changes accordingly. A court 
nevertheless might condemn the unauthorized use of the mark on the gym bags 
based on likelihood of confusion as to source or affiliation, regardless of whether 
there is any evidence relating to these other conditions.110  
 
21. European trademark law, nevertheless and by contrast, expressly confers protection against free riding. See 
Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to Approximate 
the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Recast), art. 10(2)(c), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 11 (“The 
proprietor of [a] registered trade mark shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from 
using in the course of trade, in relation to goods or services, any sign where . . . the sign is identical with, or 
similar to, the trade mark irrespective of whether it is used in relation to goods or services which are identical 
with, similar to, or not similar to, those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation 
in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.”); Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:70, ¶ 50 (June 18, 2009) (“The advantage arising from the use by a third party of a sign similar 
to a mark with a reputation is an advantage taken unfairly by that third party of the distinctive character or the 
repute of the mark where that party seeks by that use to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation in 
order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without 
paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to create 
and maintain the mark’s image.”). 
 108. See sources cited supra note 91. 
 109. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 91, at 430–33; Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark 
Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 101–10 (2009); cf. Heymann, supra note 3, at 1388 n.168. 
 110. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 91, at 498 n.150. Alternatively, suppose that Neve bought the 
bag knowing it was made by a third-party manufacturer—her twin brother Neville—without authorization; and 
that she gives the bag away to Oren. Again, regardless of how likely the Orens of the world would be to expect 
or care whether the use of the logo was authorized, or to avenge themselves against POWERADE should the 
bag disappoint, Coca-Cola might still have a plausible claim against Neville based on the possibility of post-sale 
confusion. See Heymann, supra note 3, at 1393–94 (noting, however, that some post-sale confusion cases 
involve reputational concerns, as where a fake wears out quickly, if “the observer both attributes the product’s 
faults to the mark owner and thereby changes her opinion of the brand”); id. at 1394–95, 1395 n.197 (noting that 
initial interest confusion would impact reputation only under unusual circumstances). 
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Antidilution laws, by contrast, often are viewed as protecting the reputation 
of the trademark or its owner111—though as Laura Heymann points out, this 
understanding is problematic.112 To illustrate, imagine that a firm unrelated to 
Adidas AG (the company that owns the ADIDAS mark for athletic shoes113) 
were to begin selling ADIDAS peanut butter. It might be difficult for Adidas 
AG to prove likelihood of confusion, given the lack of association between the 
products and the infrequency with which makers of athletic shoes branch out 
into culinary products;114 but the use may well constitute actionable dilution by 
blurring, since the word ADIDAS would no longer conjure up one single product 
(shoes). Alternatively, the use of ADIDAS as the name for a strip club might be 
viewed as dilution by tarnishment.115 Assuming there is no confusion as to 
source or sponsorship, however, this “change in or addition to the associations 
with the word” does not affect Adidas AG’s reputation, that is, “the collective 
judgment of the relevant community based on beliefs about the mark holder’s 
activity.”116 Even if consumers think the peanut butter tastes terrible, after all, 
Adidas AG’s reputation for the quality of its shoes should remain unaffected.117 
The harm that dilution allegedly causes, rather, is that the mark loses its aura of 
exclusivity and thus some of its selling power; or to put it another way, it loses 
some of its goodwill (the “expectation of continued patronage”).118 To be sure, 
whether the sale of ADIDAS peanut butter actually would have this effect is 
debatable; the point is simply that the effect, assuming it occurred, would not be 
reputational. 
 
 111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defining dilution by tarnishment as an “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark”); 
Heymann, supra note 3, at 1399–1400, nn.216–17 (providing examples from the case law). 
 112. See Heymann, supra note 3, at 1397–1400. 
 113. The word ADIDAS consists of the first three letters of the nickname and surname of firm founder Adi 
(Adolf) Dassler. See History, ADIDAS, https://www.adidas-group.com/en/group/history (last visited Apr. 19, 
2021). 
 114. Adidas AG almost certainly would argue likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship, however, and given 
the expansive interpretation of that doctrine by some courts it’s hardly a foregone conclusion it would lose. Cf. 
Christine Chiao, Street Snacks from the Philippines: Adidas, Betamax, and Walkman, FIRST WE FEAST (Oct. 7, 
2012), https://firstwefeast.com/eat/2012/10/street-snacks-from-the-philippines-adidas-betamax-and-walkman 
(noting that vendors of Filipino street food use the word “Adidas,” presumably without authorization, as a term 
for grilled chicken feet). 
 115. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 24:89 nn.18–19 (citing cases). 
 116. Heymann, supra note 3, at 1398. 
 117. See id. at 1400 (arguing, by way of analogy, that “the follies of a celebrity . . . with a distinctive name 
may cause anguish to non-celebrities who also happen to bear that name, but we would not say that the celebrity’s 
actions have harmed the reputation of the non-celebrity—they have merely caused salient and distasteful 
associations with the name”). 
 118. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 574 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Canadian law is more straightforward in referring to the tort as “goodwill depreciation.” See Trademarks Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c T-13, § 22(1) (Can.) (“No person shall use a trademark registered by another person in a manner 
that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching thereto.”); see also Veuve 
Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, [2006] S.C.R. 824, paras. 41, 43 (Can.) (referring to dilution 
under U.S. law as a “similar remedy” to goodwill depreciation); A. KELLY GILL, FOX ON CANADIAN LAW OF 
TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.8 (4th ed. 2019). 
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Moving on to remedies, a successful claim for trademark infringement or 
dilution119 usually results in the entry of an injunction—though since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,120 injunctive 
relief is discretionary, not mandatory, and (arguably) there is no presumption of 
irreparable harm.121 As for monetary awards, the Lanham Act states: 
   When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this 
title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been 
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s 
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the 
action.122 
In an infringement case, the “damages sustained by the plaintiff” may 
include, among other things, an award of lost profits on sales diverted to the 
defendant; in some instances, a reasonable royalty in lieu of lost profits; and any 
 
 119. Or false advertising, for which the remedies mostly overlap with the remedies for trademark 
infringement. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 1117(a); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 35–37 
(AM. L. INST. 1995). 
 120. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006). 
 121. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 
Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (agreeing with Herb Reed). But 
see Phyllis Schlafly Revocable Tr. v. Cori, 924 F.3d 1004, 1011 (8th Cir. 2019) (side-stepping issues of whether 
presumption exists); Hoop Culture, Inc. v. GAP Inc., 648 Fed. Appx. 981, 985 (11th Cir. 2016) (declining to 
speak on the presumption, citing North American Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1218 
(11th Cir. 2008)); Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 
2011) (applying eBay to trademark but not deciding whether such presumption exists). See generally 5 
MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:47.30 (recognizing disagreement among courts as to eBay’s impact on the 
presumption of irreparable harm and criticizing the Herb Reed decision as “deeply flawed”). The Lanham Act 
authorizes courts to award injunctions “according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court 
may deem reasonable.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Most trademark infringement cases are litigated under the Lanham 
Act, though it is not uncommon for plaintiffs to assert supplemental claims under corresponding state trademark 
laws; and while federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Lanham Act cases, most of them wind 
up in federal court. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 32:1. 
  Shortly before this Article went to press, Congress enacted, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2021, the Trademark Modernization Act (TMA) of 2020. The TMA adds the following new language to 
Lanham Act § 1116(a): 
A plaintiff seeking any such injunction shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable 
harm upon a finding of a violation identified in this subsection in the case of a motion for a 
permanent injunction or upon a finding of likelihood of success on the merits for a violation 
identified in this subsection in the case of a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary 
restraining order.  
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 226, 134 Stat. 1182, 2208 (2020) (amending 15 
U.S.C. § 1116(a)). 
 122. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see also id. § 1111 (permitting owners of registered marks to provide notice of 
the registration by, for example, using the symbol ®, and stating that “in any suit for infringement under this 
chapter by such a registrant failing to give such notice of registration, no profits and no damages shall be 
recovered under the provisions of this chapter unless the defendant had actual notice of the registration”). 
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expenses reasonably incurred in response to the infringement.123 Traditionally, 
however, courts awarded the infringer’s own profits only in cases of intentional 
or willful infringement124—though in its recent Romag Fasteners decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act does not require proof of willfulness 
as a prerequisite to an award of profits.125 Plaintiffs are not entitled to duplicative 
awards, nonetheless, so if an award of profits would overlap with actual 
damages, the plaintiff must elect between the two.126 The Lanham Act also 
authorizes courts to enhance or reduce damages or profits, in the following 
(somewhat cryptic127) language: 
In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the 
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual 
damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that 
the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive 
the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall 
find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either 
of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.128 
Enhancements sometimes follow if the infringement is found to be willful 
and/or there is reason to believe that quantifiable damages or profits understate, 
 
 123. See, e.g., 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, §§ 30:79–87; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 36 & cmt. d; James M. Koelemay, Jr., A Practical Guide to Monetary Relief in Trademark Infringement Cases, 
85 TRADEMARK REP. 263, 281–85 (1995). 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 36 cmt. c, 37(1) & cmts. c, e–f (noting, among 
other matters, that awarding profits in cases of innocent infringement might over-deter (chill) lawful behavior, 
and provide plaintiffs with a windfall); Pamela Samuelson, John M. Golden & Mark P. Gergen, Recalibrating 
the Disgorgement Remedy in Intellectual Property Cases, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1999, 2008–09, 2014 (2020); see 
also BEEBE ET AL., supra note 69, at 393 (“To avoid the risk of overdeterrence, courts therefore may be wise to 
limit restitutionary awards to cases of willful trademark infringement . . . .”); Koelemay, supra note 123, at 267. 
 125. See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1494, 1497 (2020) (stating that, while “a 
trademark defendant’s mental state is a highly important consideration in determining whether an award of 
profits is appropriate,” there is no “categorical rule” that the plaintiff must prove willful infringement). In a brief 
concurring opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, stated that “[t]he relevant authorities, 
particularly pre-Lanham Act case law, show that willfulness is a highly important consideration in awarding 
profits under § 1117(a), but not an absolute precondition.” Id. at 1497 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, 
concurring in the judgment only, agreed that the Lanham Act “does not impose a ‘willfulness’ prerequisite,” but 
observed that historically courts “defined ‘willfulness’ to encompass a range of culpable mental states—
including the equivalent of recklessness, but excluding ‘good faith’ or negligence,” and that “profits were hardly, 
if ever, awarded for innocent infringement.” Id. at 1498 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 126. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:73; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. 
c. There are some additional remedies for counterfeiting, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B)(ii). See id. §§ 
1116(d)(1)(A) (ex parte seizures), 1117(a)–(c) (treble damages of profits, statutory damages), 1118 
(destruction); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (criminal penalties for trafficking in counterfeit goods or services). 
 127. See, e.g., 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:91 (noting different interpretations of the “not a penalty” 
language); Mark A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 245, 311 (2010) (concluding, after an exhaustive discussion of the legislative history, that the inclusion 
of “the ‘not a penalty’ language in the Lanham Act remains a mystery”). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
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respectively, the plaintiff’s loss or the defendant’s gain.129 The Act also 
authorizes awards of attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.”130 
Given that some acts of trademark infringement cause consumers to buy 
less of a firm’s products, based either on their own or others’ mistaken beliefs, 
economic damages in the form of lost profits to some degree compensate for 
these harms to the owner’s goodwill or reputation. So, too, might an award of 
damages for expenses the owner reasonably incurred in response to the 
infringement, such as corrective advertising or warnings to prospective 
customers.131 When owners seek additional damages for harms to their goodwill 
or reputation, moreover, they sometimes succeed on the basis of two additional 
theories.132  
 
 129. See Merck Eprova AG & Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 262–63 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming an award of 
enhanced profits “to reflect the intangible benefits” accruing to the defendant in a false advertising case); Taco 
Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the “not a penalty” 
language to mean that enhancements may “provide proper redress to an otherwise undercompensated plaintiff 
where imprecise damage calculations fail to do justice, particularly where the imprecision results from 
defendant’s conduct”), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, §§ 30:90–92; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. m; Koelemay, supra note 123, at 295. Federal law also authorizes 
additional penalties for trademark counterfeiting, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B)(ii). See id. 
§§ 1116(d)(1)(A) (ex parte seizures), 1117(a)–(c) (treble damages of profits, statutory damages), 1118 
(destruction); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (setting forth criminal penalties for trafficking in counterfeit goods or 
services). Finally, punitive damages sometimes may be available for infringement in violation of state trademark 
law. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:96; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. n. 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). A case may be exceptional if the defendant engaged in willful infringement, or if 
either party litigated in bad faith. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, §§ 30:99–101; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. o.  
 131. See, e.g., Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 689–93 (6th Cir. 2000); U-
Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 36 cmt. f (“Correction of the defendant’s misrepresentation or warnings to prospective 
purchasers not to be misled may avoid a loss of sales or injury to reputation . . . . Expenditures reasonably 
incurred by the plaintiff in connection with . . . corrections or warnings can be recovered as damages . . . .”); see 
also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:83; Paul Heald, Comment, Money Damages and Corrective Advertising: 
An Economic Analysis, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 629, 632–33 (1988). 
 132. As noted previously, harm to reputation is often classified as a type of noneconomic harm (which may, 
nevertheless, result in tangible losses such as loss of income). The Restatement of Unfair Competition 
nevertheless states, without explanation, that “[t]he pecuniary loss for which damages may be recovered under 
this Section includes . . . harm to the market reputation of the plaintiff’s goods, services, business, or trademark.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36(2); see also id. cmt. c. Perhaps the distinction rests on the 
assumption that trademark owners are mostly business entities, and that harm to the reputation (or, more broadly, 
the goodwill) of such an entity is more readily quantifiable than is harm to a natural person’s reputation. See, 
e.g., Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2012) (Noonan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (stating that “[g]oodwill is difficult to quantify but is regularly assessed by accountants 
in the course of the purchase of a business,” and “[f]or accounting purposes . . . is typically the difference 
between the fair market value of the company and its underlying assets and liabilities”; further, while calculation 
can be difficult for a non-publicly traded company, “there are a variety of methods that might be employed in 
calculating goodwill and the harm to that asset caused by the” infringer) (citing Robert F. Reilly, SFAS Nos. 141 
and 142 Implications for Goodwill Acquired by M&A, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2006, at 48); Heald, supra note 
131, at 650–57 (proposing methods for measuring harm to goodwill); Meiring De Villiers, Quantitative Proof 
of Reputational Harm, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 567, 584, 614 (2010) (“[A] decline in the value of the 
securities of a defamed corporation, adjusted for factors unrelated to the defamation, constitutes legally valid 
evidence of special damages for reputational harm.”). In any event, my concern here is not with terminology but 
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First, courts occasionally have awarded damages to fund a future corrective 
advertising campaign intended both to remedy past harm, and to forestall future 
harm, to the plaintiff’s goodwill or reputation.133 Courts sometimes have pegged 
the dollar value of such corrective advertising at twenty-five percent of the 
defendant’s advertising budget,134 though as critics have noted this arbitrary 
figure can be either over- or under-compensatory of the amount needed to 
compensate for harm to goodwill or reputation.135 In particular, it makes little 
economic sense to award damages for corrective advertising that exceed the 
plaintiff’s pre-infringement net worth.136  
 
rather whether harm to reputation is or should be considered a cognizable injury resulting from an act of IP 
infringement, and if so how that harm is or should be redressed. 
  As for emotional harm, again most trademark owners are business entities, for whom such damages 
would never be appropriate, even if the Lanham Act otherwise permitted them—which, under current law, it 
almost certainly doesn’t. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131–32 
(2014) (holding that plaintiffs asserting claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act “must allege an injury to a 
commercial interest in reputation or sales”). This language from Lexmark would appear to rule out damages for 
emotional distress, even if the plaintiff trademark owner is a natural person, as for example in a celebrity false 
endorsement case—though such a person may be able to seek such damages for violation of her right of privacy 
or publicity, as discussed in the following Subpart. But see BBC Grp. NV LLC v. Island Life Rest. Grp. LLC, 
No. C18-1011 RSM, 2020 WL 758070, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2020) (permitting individual owners of a 
restaurant to try to recover damages for emotional distress arising from counterclaim defendant’s alleged 
trademark infringement, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Lanham Act § 35(a))). 
 133. The first such infringement case to approve this practice appears to be Big O. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. 
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber, 408 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D. Colo. 1976), aff’d as modified, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th 
Cir. 1977); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:82 (collecting other cases); Koelemay, supra note 123, 
at 282–83. 
 134. See Big O, 561 F.2d at 1374 (noting that the Federal Trade Commission sometimes had required 
defendants found to have engaged in deceptive trade practices to undertake affirmative corrective advertising, 
equal in value to twenty-five percent of the amount spent on deceptive advertising); see also W. Des Moines 
State Bank v. Hawkeye Bancorporation, 722 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1983); Aetna Health Care Sys. v. Health 
Care Choice, Inc., No. 84-C-642-E, 1986 WL 84362, at *18 (N.D. Okla. May 15, 1986) (trebling the award 
further). Like the Federal Trade Commission, courts adjudicating trademark infringement and false advertising 
cases also sometimes require defendants to engage in corrective advertising. See, e.g., ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. 
Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d 949, 972–73 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting, however, that such orders must be carefully 
tailored to avoid prohibiting lawful commercial speech); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, §§ 30:50–56; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. g (“[A] defendant will not ordinarily be required to 
engage in corrective advertising unless the adverse effects of the misconduct are likely to persist in the absence 
of such measures.”). 
 135. See Heald, supra note 131, at 632–33; see also Macia v. Microsoft Corp., 335 F. Supp. 2d 507, 521 (D. 
Vt. 2004) (refusing to award corrective advertising damages because of a lack of identical marks and bad faith, 
and calling into question whether Big O “provides a non-speculative method of computing damages”); 5 
MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 30:84; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. f (“[A] claim 
for expenditures to be undertaken in the future should be subject to greater scrutiny, and . . . may be inappropriate 
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a lack of resources or other reasonable justification for the failure to take the 
corrective measures prior to the litigation.”). 
 136. See Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating, by way of analogy, that 
“[e]xpenses for repair cannot be justified when they exceed the value of the asset. If a car worth $4,000 is crushed 
in a collision and repair would cost $10,000, the court awards damages of $4,000, not $10,000”); 5 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 88, § 30:84 (stating that it is “grossly uneconomical” to award damages equal to “several times [the 
plaintiff’s] net worth to use to resuscitate an infringed trademark. When such an award is many times the value 
of the trademark property, then it appears that plaintiff has received a windfall, not compensation”); see also 
David Haas, Nicholas Vasdekas & Jordan Salins, Measuring the Mark: Use of Analytics in Trademark 
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Second, without referring to corrective advertising as such, courts 
sometimes have awarded damages for harm to goodwill or to reputation. In 
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,137 for example, the court affirmed an award 
of $1.6 million based on evidence, first, that the plaintiff had suffered injury in 
fact as established by: 
(i) the importance of its particular “business reputation” in the filter market 
and the extent to which Porous relies upon that reputation; (ii) that the 
[defendant’s product] ALERT damaged Porous’s reputation; and (iii) the 
particular types of reputational injuries suffered by Porous (in addition to lost 
sales, “[W]e’ve had to jump through hoops to work with [our customers] and 
overcome references to hydrophobicity and how it works in their application 
and supply additional information to these companies.”). In addition, Pall’s 
internal marketing documents themselves document a “continued loyalty” to 
Pall’s product as a “result” of Pall’s warnings about the Porous filter’s alleged 
hydrophobic shortcomings.138 
Second, the court rejected a challenge that the amount was unduly 
speculative, citing testimony  
that the company had lost “between $5 million and $10 million” in going-
concern value based not simply upon lost sales but rather Porous’s lost 
opportunity to “create a reputation for being the industry leader” and its 
damaged efforts to “creat[e] a reputation to be able to move onto the next 
level” beyond the oxygen-concentrator market.139 
Similarly, in Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi,140 the court affirmed a 
multimillion dollar damages award based on “ample evidence proving the 
original value of Skydive Arizona’s goodwill and the scope and depth of 
SKYRIDE’s harm to Skydive Arizona’s reputation,” including ten years’ worth 
of advertising “expenditures it made to build up the goodwill and reputation of 
its mark” and “multiple declarations and witness testimony proving that 
customers were very angry with, and blamed Skydive Arizona for, problems 
 
Infringement Cases, 27 BRIGHT IDEAS 5, 6–7 (2018) (proposing the use of website analytics and social media 
data to identify “the scale and cost of potential corrective marketing and advertising activities”). 
 137. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 138. Id. at 1122–23 (alterations in original). 
 139. Id. at 1122 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original). The court went on to state that it was “not 
certain that this testimony alone would sustain the jury’s verdict,” but would not “pronounce a ‘rule of law that 
the testimony of a company’s principals is too speculative to establish a material fact.’” Id. at 1122 n.12 (quoting 
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1340 (8th Cir. 1997)). Additionally: 
[W]e are not convinced that the dollar figure was the product of abject speculation by Porous’s 
principal. We believe that the record as a whole demonstrates the type of goodwill injury suffered by 
Porous, the extent of that injury, and the causal nexus between the ALERT and Porous’s damaged 
goodwill. Reputational damages are often difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, Porous need not prove 
such damages with exacting precision, for “a misleading comparison to a specific competing product 
necessarily diminishes that product’s value in the minds of the customer.” 
Id. (citing Porous Media, 110 F.3d at 1335). 
 140. Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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caused by SKYRIDE.”141 The opinion is confusing, however, in that it does not 
clearly articulate the grounds for affirming separate awards of $1 million in 
“actual damages” for false advertising, $2.5 million in “actual damages” for 
trademark infringement, and an additional $2.5 million of the defendant’s 
profits.142  
In the alternative, a court might award the defendant’s profits, or an 
enhancement thereof, to compensate for proven but unquantified harm to the 
plaintiff’s goodwill or reputation143—a practice consistent with the principle, 
noted above, that courts may award an enhancement when there is reason to 
believe that quantifiable damages understate the plaintiff’s actual harm.144 
Notice, however, that in most of the cases in which courts have awarded 
damages or profits for harm to reputation or goodwill, the defendant was found 
to have engaged in intentional or willful misconduct—and thus was, in some 
sense, responsible for its own predicament.145 Courts otherwise may be less 
 
 141. Id. at 1112. 
 142. See id. at 1109–14 (referring, confusingly, to the award of defendant’s profits as “lost profits”). The 
Court of Appeals also affirmed six separate awards of $100,000 in statutory damages for cybersquatting but 
reversed the damages enhancement as being entirely punitive in nature. See id. at 1114–16. For other cases in 
this vein, see Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477, 485–86 (8th Cir. 1967) (affirming award 
of $7,500 for harm to reputation, even though “there was no effort to prove the total sales or to arrive at an 
accounting of the profits,” where “numerous witnesses testified that Heaton had substituted and delivered Water 
King water softener units when they thought they had purchased and were receiving Lindsay units,” and that 
customers were “disgusted at the untrustworthiness of those whom they considered to be Lindsay personnel, 
and . . . extremely dissatisfied with the product which had been palmed off on them”); Singer Mfg. Co. v. 
Redlich, 109 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 
F.3d 829, 846–47 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of new trial on damages, where jury had awarded $750,000 
for harm to reputation and $300,000 for loss of goodwill under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and 
holding that although the evidence was “sufficient to provide a legal basis for the jury’s award,” it “was minimal 
at best,” and the award “contradicted the court’s supplemental instruction to the jurors that these two measures 
of damages are ‘essentially the same’”). 
 143. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. P.K. Sorren Export Co. of Fla., 546 F. Supp. 987, 998–99 (S.D. Fla. 1982) 
(awarding double profits, where “[i]nevitably, there must have been some harm to PEI’s goodwill and 
reputation,” although this was “not . . . sufficiently demonstrated or quantified to justify an award on that basis,” 
and “one could infer from the records of AIS and Rolex that the defendants actually sold more infringing shirts 
than can be shown from defendants’ records”); see also ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d 
949, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that enhancement may be appropriate to remedy the “continuing 
distortion in the market” in a false advertising case); N.Y. Racing Ass’n v. Stroup News Agency Corp., 920 F. 
Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The Court cannot compute the value of the intangible benefits Stroup received 
as a result of its deliberate, flagrant, and mulish violation of NYRA’s mark . . . . The Court will treble the profits 
award . . . .”); Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 901 F. Supp. 2d 436, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (trebling damages 
in order to compensate the loss of “market share, customer loyalty, and potential customers” in false advertising 
case), aff’d, 760 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. c (AM. L. 
INST. 1995) (“If the plaintiff in fact suffers harm such as injury to its reputation, that harm may be regarded as 
compensated by the award of the defendant’s profits to the extent that the profits exceed the plaintiff’s proven 
losses.”). 
 144. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Skydive Ariz., 673 F.3d at 1109–10, 1114; Heaton, 387 F.2d at 481 (“[S]purious merchandise was 
purposely palmed off as Lindsay products by several of appellant’s sales representatives, who represented 
themselves as authorized Lindsay personnel.”); Playboy, 546 F. Supp. at 991, 997; Singer, 109 F. Supp. at 627. 
But see Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1122–23 (8th Cir. 1999) (leaving unresolved the 
question of whether the jury found the defendant’s false and misleading statements to have been willful); 
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inclined to award damages for harm to goodwill, absent evidence of some 
quantifiable decline in value.146  
As for dilution, the federal statute restricts the recovery of damages or 
profits to cases in which the defendant “willfully intended” either “to trade on 
the recognition of the famous mark” or “to harm the reputation of the famous 
mark.”147 The legislative history is silent on the rationale for this limitation, 
though one might suspect it has something to do with the inherent difficulty of 
quantifying a reduction in a mark’s “selling power”148—or out of concern that 
the prospect of substantial monetary liability could over-deter lawful conduct, 
unless limited to only the most egregious cases.149 In any event, there appear to 
be only a handful of reported decisions in which a U.S. court has awarded 
monetary relief for trademark dilution. One involved the willful dilution by 
 
Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., No. C09–285Z, 2011 WL 4402775, at *7 (W.D. 
Wash. Sept. 21, 2011) (finding no willfulness), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 
762 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 146. See Engineered Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Applied Mech. Tech., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 962, 965–66 (M.D. La. 
1984) (finding that the “defendant’s conduct was not fraudulent and in bad faith,” and that “plaintiffs have 
presented no evidence on loss of goodwill, damage to their reputation, the need for corrective advertising and 
no evidence of any numerical values on which such an estimate could be based. In the absence of any evidence 
of actual damages, the court will not award an amount for damages”); see also Skydive Ariz., 673 F.3d at 1116, 
1117 (Noonan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that neither the defendant’s own profits nor 
the “‘the hundreds of thousands of dollars’ spent by Skydive Arizona on advertising” established the value of 
the harm to Skydive Arizona’s goodwill,” and that Skydive Arizona’s “own figures showed no diminution in 
dives sold”); Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 693–95 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that literal falsity does not alleviate the plaintiff from the burden of proving actual damages for loss of goodwill, 
and that while some courts presume that deliberate falsity or bad faith causes harm to goodwill, any such 
presumption was defeated where there was no evidence that the plaintiff had lost any sales or that consumers 
actually had been deceived); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(citing Engineered Mech. Servs. for the proposition that actual damages may include “quantifiable harm to the 
plaintiff’s good will”). 
 147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5). On willful dilution by tarnishment, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 24:132 
(questioning whether many companies intend “to spitefully harm the reputation of a noncompetitor,” and that 
suggesting that congressional intent may have been “to simply require that the purposeful and non-negligent 
actions of the defendant . . . could constitute an ‘intent to harm the reputation’”). 
  Some state antidilution laws preclude damages for dilution altogether, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 
88, § 24:81, while others contain provisions substantially similar to the federal act, see id. §§ 24:79, 24:79.50; 
but there appear to be no cases awarding damages for violation of state antidilution laws. The Restatement makes 
no express provision for damages in dilution cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 
(stating rules for awarding damages in deceptive advertising and trademark infringement cases). 
 148. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 24:81 (“It is difficult to compute and measure money damages to 
compensate for any subtle impairment caused by actual dilution.”); supra notes 97, 118 and accompanying text. 
At the same time, allowing monetary relief for willful dilution, rather than precluding such relief altogether, 
might seem consistent with the tolerance for more speculative awards in cases of intentional or willful 
infringement or false advertising. 
 149. To be clear, if the legal standards for dilution were unambiguous, and prospective defendants aware of 
the owner’s rights in advance, there would be little risk of chilling (over-deterring) lawful conduct. Because the 
first condition in particular often may not be true, however, the risk that a court might find, correctly or not, the 
defendant’s conduct to be unlawful, poses some risk that the prospect of substantial monetary liability would 
cause defendants to over-comply with their legal obligations—to the possible detriment of the public interest in 
robust competition, free speech, or other interests. Analogous risks of overdeterrence pervade all of the bodies 
of law under consideration in this Article, and weigh in favor of some degree of caution in extending liability 
beyond current boundaries. 
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tarnishment of Mattel’s BARBIE mark for a phone sex service, for which the 
defendant was required to disgorge gross profits of $7,300.150 Another involved 
a recovery of $105,000 for dilution by blurring,151 but has been critiqued for 
awarding damages that duplicated the award for infringement.152   
B. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
As noted earlier, the Restatement of Torts recommends that states 
recognize the unauthorized appropriation of name or likeness as a violation of 
the right of privacy; and that they award, as appropriate, general damages for 
“the harm to [t]his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion,” mental 
distress, and reputational harm,153 as well as special damages “for the loss of the 
exclusive use of the value so appropriated,” or “restitution of benefits tortiously 
obtained.”154 In addition to this privacy-based right, however, many states also 
recognize a separate right of publicity, which the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition defines as the appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s 
identity . . . for purposes of trade.”155 Doctrinally, the principal distinction 
between the privacy and publicity torts is that the latter characterizes the 
commercial value of a person’s identity as a property interest, which can be 
transferred and enforced, not only during the subject’s lifetime but also post-
mortem.156 For the invasion of the property interest, courts commonly award 
economic damages in the form of lost profits or reasonable royalties, or 
alternatively the disgorgement of the defendant’s profits (and, in egregious 
cases, punitive damages).157 In addition, celebrity plaintiffs sometimes assert 
 
 150. See Mattel Inc. v. Jcom Inc., No. 97 CIV. 7191 (SS), 1998 WL 766711, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 
1998). 
 151. See B & H Mfg. Co. v. Bright, No. CVF016619AWISMS, 2005 WL 1342815, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 
10, 2005).  
 152. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 88, § 24:132 n.13 (criticizing the decision on the ground that there was 
“no evidence of loss of strength of plaintiff’s mark that was caused by dilution, separate from the award of 
$501,000 for trademark infringement”). In a third decision, Blumenthal Distributing, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 
the district concluded, based on the “totality of the evidence,” including “consumer confusion, marketing costs, 
the fame of the EAMES chair trade dress,” that “an appropriate award” for the defendant’s alleged willful 
trademark dilution was $3 million. Blumenthal Distrib., Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 
EDCV1401926JAKSPX, 2017 WL 3271706, at *16–17, *22 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2017). On appeal, however, the 
court reversed the judgment of liability for dilution. See Blumenthal Distrib., Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 963 
F.3d 859, 871 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 2021 WL 850632 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2021). 
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H & cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 154. Id. § 652H cmts. d–e. 
 155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1995); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3344 (West 2020); FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2020); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/10 (2020). 
 156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmts. a–b, g, h.  
 157. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 31, §§ 11:30–32, 11:34, 11:36 (collecting cases); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmts. d–e. But see Samuelson et al., supra note 123, at 
2003 n.13 (noting that disgorgement of profit is not available under some state right of publicity laws). Some 
state publicity laws (such as the one cited by Samuelson et al.) permit in the alternative modest statutory 
damages. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.810 (2019) (allowing recovery of “actual damages, but not less than 
$750,” plus “exemplary or punitive damages, if the trier of fact finds that the defendant knowingly made use of 
the name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness of another person without” written consent). 
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parallel claims for false endorsement, for which these types of damages would 
be independently available.158 
On occasion, courts also have awarded right of publicity claimants 
damages for reputational harm and for mental distress.159 Although some 
authorities argue that mental distress damages should be available only for 
violations of the privacy tort, and not for the publicity or false endorsement 
torts,160 in practice, courts do not always make such sharp distinctions.161 For 
example, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,162 the singer Tom Waits challenged the 
defendant’s broadcasting of a television commercial that included the 
soundtrack of another singer imitating Waits’s performance of a song that Waits 
previously had recorded.163 While characterizing Waits’s vocal 
misappropriation claim as “one for invasion of a personal property right: his 
right of publicity to control the use of his identity as embodied in his voice,”164 
the court affirmed a damages judgment that included not only “$100,000 for the 
fair market value of [Waits’s] services,” but also “$200,000 for injury to 
[Waits’s] peace, happiness and feelings,”165 stating: 
Although the injury stemming from violation of the right of publicity “may be 
largely, or even wholly, of an economic or material nature,” we have 
recognized that “it is quite possible that the appropriation of the identity of a 
celebrity may induce humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress.”  
 
 158. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1012–14 (3d Cir. 2008); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1996); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 
1992); 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 31, § 11:35 (“But plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for 
the same injury under both state right of publicity and federal false endorsement law.”); see also Hirsch v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 130–31 (Wis. 1979) (alleging both appropriation under right of publicity 
and trade name infringement). 
 159. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102–12 (affirming compensatory damages for economic harm, as well mental 
distress and injury to reputation); Olive v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 804, 827 (Ct. App. 2018) 
(affirming award of $213,000 in “actual damages” and $910,000 for emotional distress, for unauthorized use of 
model’s image in advertising); Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 61–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming $15 
million award for violation of the right of publicity, based in part on evidence of lost future endorsement 
opportunities resulting from association with defendant’s comic book); see also Abdul-Jabbar, 75 F.3d at 1400 
(reversing judgment for defendant, in view of evidence that advertisement referring to Abdul-Jabbar as “Lew 
Alcindor” would make it more difficult for plaintiff to endorse other cars and that he had suffered emotionally 
because people might think he had renounced Islam) (“Injury to a plaintiff’s right of publicity is not limited to 
present or future economic loss, but ‘may induce humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress.’”) (quoting 
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103). 
 160. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003); 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, 
supra note 31, § 11:31; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. a.  
 161. And perhaps they shouldn’t. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY 
REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 126–27 (2018) (arguing that, because “one’s identity . . . is not detachable 
from the underlying person,” publicity rights should be understood as encompassing both dignitary and 
pecuniary interests). Of course, to the extent both types of claims arise from the same set of facts, it’s not clear 
that it makes any practical difference if one type of damages is available for breach of the privacy tort only, and 
another for breach of the publicity tort. 
 162. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1093.  
 163. See id. at 1097–98.   
 164. Id. at 1103. 
 165. Id.  
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. . . . 
Added to . . . evidence of Waits’ shock, anger, and embarrassment is the 
strong inference that, because of his outspoken public stance against doing 
commercial endorsements, the Doritos commercial humiliated Waits by 
making him an apparent hypocrite. This evidence was sufficient both to allow 
the jury to consider mental distress damages and to support their eventual 
award.166 
In addition, the court affirmed a $75,000 award for injury to Waits’s 
goodwill, noting possible injury to Waits’s artistic reputation, as well as 
testimony that “if [he] ever wanted to do a commercial in the future, the fee he 
could command would be lowered by $50,000 to $150,000 because of the 
Doritos commercial.”167 Finally, the court affirmed liability on Waits’s false 
endorsement claim but vacated the $100,000 awarded for this tort as duplicative 
of the award for the fair market value of Waits’s services.168  
In other cases, similarly, courts might award damages for reputational harm 
to compensate for a purported loss of future income or business opportunities,169 
or for corrective advertising.170  
C. COPYRIGHT 
For various reasons, as we have seen, trademarks and publicity rights 
confer protection upon indicia of source, sponsorship, or identity. Copyright 
law, by contrast, confers exclusive rights in works of authorship—more 
precisely, original works of authorship, fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression171—including, among other things, literary works; music; motion 
pictures; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; sound recordings; 
choreography; and architecture.172 In the United States, the dominant 
 
 166. Id. (quoting Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1974)) 
(citation omitted). 
 167. Id. at 1104.  
 168. Id. at 1111.  
 169. See Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 61–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, 
supra note 31, § 11:33. 
 170. See Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., No. 81-1461-R, 1982 WL 916836, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 1982) 
(awarding one-fourth of defendant’s advertising expenditures to fund a “reasonable corrective advertising 
campaign” in a case involving false endorsement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. 
d (AM. L. INST. 1995). Oddly, perhaps, given the asserted difficulty of quantifying the injury caused by trademark 
dilution, the case law and commentary on publicity rights sometimes embraces a diminution of selling power 
rationale for awarding damages for reputational harm. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 31, 
§ 11:33 (stating that unauthorized use “may overexpose plaintiff commercially, depreciating the value of future 
commercial licenses,” or “irreparably damage plaintiff’s . . . future licensing opportunities, if plaintiff is 
perceived . . . as associating with a product the public knows plaintiff neither uses nor recommends”). 
 171. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also id. § 101 (defining fixation); Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (defining originality). For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the standard 
term of protection consists of the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (stating the above 
as the general rule for works created on or after January 1, 1978); see also id. §§ 302(b)–(c), 303, 304 (setting 
forth the duration of copyright for joint works, anonymous and pseudonymous works, works made for hire, and 
works created prior to January 1, 1978). 
 172. See 17  U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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justification for copyright protection is that it provides a necessary incentive for 
the creation and publication of works such as these, which can be expensive to 
produce but easy to copy.173 Subject to a variety of exceptions, copyright owners 
enjoy the right to reproduce or adapt the work, to publicly perform or display it, 
and to distribute copies to the public.174 
For the infringement of copyright rights, U.S. law offers, at the discretion 
of the court, the possibility of injunctive relief,175 as well as various monetary 
remedies. First, the statute provides that the owner “is entitled to recover the 
actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any 
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken 
into account in computing the actual damages.”176 Actual damages typically 
include lost profits on lost sales, as well as other expenses (if any) incurred as a 
result of the breach.177 (Opinions differ regarding whether the statutory language 
authorizes, as an alternative, an award of a reasonable royalty.178) Awards of 
infringers’ profits are, as the statute indicates, another possibility, and unlike 
trademark law there is no tradition of explicitly limiting such awards to cases 
involving intentional or willful infringement.179 Alternatively, if the owner has 
timely registered her claim to copyright,180 the trier of fact may award statutory 
damages in an amount ranging from $750 to $30,000 for each work infringed.181   
 
 173. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 360–61 (2005). Other views, 
advocated in some of the scholarly literature or embodied in some other countries’ copyright systems (or in 
isolated aspects of even U.S. copyright law) are that authors are morally entitled to a property interest in the fruit 
of their labor, à la John Locke, or that respect for the author’s individuality entails respect for her creative work. 
For discussion, see id. at 402–03; see also ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) 
(arguing, based on the writings of Locke and Kant, that creators have a moral entitlement to rights in their 
intellectual creations); infra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophical foundation of 
moral rights). 
 174. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also id. §§ 107–22 (listing various statutory exceptions). 
 175. See id. § 502. For certain types of activities, however, the statute provides for compulsory licensing. 
See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2008) (listing 
examples). 
 176. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
 177. See 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 14.1.1.1 (3d ed. 2019) (collecting cases); 4 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02[A][1], [2] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2019) 
[hereinafter NIMMER]; 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:101–06 (rev. ed. 2019). 
 178. For discussion of the case law, see 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 177, § 14.1.1.1; 4 NIMMER, supra note 
177, § 14.05; 6 PATRY, supra note 177, § 22:111, 22:124–30. 
 179. See 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 177, § 14.1.2, 14.1.2.1 (noting, however, that some decisions take 
willfulness into account in deciding whether the defendant can deduct certain expenses from its revenue); 4 
NIMMER, supra note 177, § 14.05; 6 PATRY, supra note 177, § 22:116,  22:143, 22:144. For liability to attach, 
there does have to be copying, but it can be innocent or unintentional—as when a defendant is unaware that the 
work at issue is subject to copyright protection, or engages in subconscious copying. See Roger D. Blair & 
Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1585, 1676 n.302 (1998). 
 180. See 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
 181. See id. § 504(c)(1). The amount can be raised, up to $150,000, for willful infringement, see id. 
§ 504(c)(2), or reduced (slightly) for certain types of innocent infringement, see id. The standard justifications 
for statutory damages are (1) that they roughly approximate actual losses, in cases in which actual damages are 
difficult to calculate; and (2) that they serve the purposes of retribution and deterrence. See Oren Bracha & Talha 
Syed, The Wrongs of Copyright’s Statutory Damages, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1230–48 (2020). Bracha and Syed 
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In general, courts have been willing to entertain claims for harm to 
reputation or goodwill as an aspect of actual damages. In Harolds Stores, Inc. v. 
Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,182 for example, the plaintiff owned nineteen 
fabric design copyrights, which the defendant copied and included on skirts that 
it offered for sale at a price below the plaintiff’s.183 The district court entered 
judgment of $260,220 for injury to Harold’s goodwill based on the theory that 
customers who saw the infringing skirts for sale at Dillard would conclude that 
Harold’s overcharged for its merchandise, and thus would be less likely to 
engage in future business with Harold’s.184 The Tenth Circuit affirmed based on 
(1) testimony of Harold’s CEO estimating harm to the company’s goodwill 
ranging from $225,000 to $500,000, and (2) expert testimony, based on a survey 
of 1,231 female college students, that “women who saw the infringing skirts at 
Dillard were somewhat unlikely to purchase clothes from Harold’s within the 
next year,” resulting in damage “to goodwill, reputation, and sales to future and 
prospective customers in the range of $266,367.00 to $517,809.00.”185 Other 
courts have agreed that, in principle, damages for harm to goodwill or reputation 
are recoverable, though often the supporting evidence turns out to be too 
speculative.186   
 
critique these standard justifications and argue that the optimal deterrence justification overlooks distributive 
equity and aggregation concerns. See id. 
 182. Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996). The caption of the 
case spells the plaintiff’s name “Harolds,” but the text of the opinion spells it “Harold’s.” 
 183. See id. at 1539. 
 184. See id. at 1540, 1552. 
 185. Id. at 1545, 1547, 1551–52. 
 186. See Lawton v. Melville Corp., 116 F.3d 1472, 1997 WL 346129, at *2 (2d Cir. 1997) (table) (failure 
of proof); Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1985) (failure of proof); Baldwin Cooke 
Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404, 408 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (failure of proof); U.S. Home Constr. v. R.A. 
Kot Homes, Inc., No. CIV. 07-1274 JRT/FLN, 2007 WL 3037321, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2007) (denying 
motion to strike claim for damages related to reputational harm and loss of goodwill); Pavlica v. Behr, No. 03 
CIV. 9628 (DC), 2006 WL 1596763, at * 8 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss); Dumas v. 
Dagl, No. 88 CIV. 2293 (LBS), 1990 WL 258343, at *3 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1990) (failure of proof); 3 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 177, § 14.1.1.2; 4 NIMMER, supra note 177, §§ 14.02[A][2], 14.03[B][2][d]; see also 
Phillip Johnson, Copyright Infringement and Damages for Reputation, 42 E.I.P.R. 819, 822–25 (2020) 
(discussing three ways in which copyright infringement might affect reputation: by causing a loss of exclusivity,  
harm to the owner’s reputation for originality, and brand damage). But see 6 PATRY, supra note 177, § 22:108 
(arguing that “[l]oss of goodwill is not an element of the prima facie case of copyright infringement and is not 
compensable in an award of damages,” as it is in trademark law, and that “such awards are inherently 
unquantifiable and therefore speculative”); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in 
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 506 (2009) (asserting that courts 
should “not award statutory damages to compensate the plaintiff for injuries that are not cognizable by U.S. 
copyright law, for example, reputational harm or privacy intrusions”). Although I agree with Samuelson and 
Wheatland that courts should not use statutory damages to compensate for non-cognizable harm—and with all 
or most of their other recommendations for ensuring that courts do not award excessive or overdeterrent statutory 
damages—I disagree that reputational harm is or should be non-cognizable across the board, particularly in cases 
involving moral rights. See infra Parts II.D, III.B. 
   Relatedly, in some copyright infringement cases, courts have stated that damages may be awarded for 
the defendant’s failure to attribute the work to the plaintiff, even though lack of attribution itself is not an act of 
infringement. See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 238–39 (2d Cir. 1998); Joseph J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. 
U.S. Dev. Corp., No. 84 C 8803, 1991 WL 38714, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1991) (“This type of intangible injury 
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By contrast, most of the decisions to date have concluded that emotional 
harm does not constitute a cognizable injury under U.S. copyright law.187 In 
Nunes v. Rushton,188 for example, the court reasoned the statutory language 
providing that “an infringer is liable for ‘the copyright owner’s actual damages 
and any additional profits of the infringer,’” indicates that “the ‘actual damages’ 
suffered by the copyright owner and the profits reaped by the infringer are two 
sides of the same coin”—thus “suggest[ing] that the copyright owner’s ‘actual 
damages’ must similarly be economic in nature.”189 Moreover, the court 
reasoned that while emotional distress damages may be recoverable for the 
violation of federal statutes intended “to protect consumers, prevent 
discrimination, or eradicate racial prejudice,” “no such purpose . . . can be 
attributed to the Copyright Act.”190 In a similar vein, in ruling on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit in Garcia v. Google, Inc.191 concluded 
that recognition of emotional distress as a cognizable harm would be 
“incompatible with . . . copyright’s function as the engine of expression.”192 
Thus far, the only federal copyright case to the contrary (aside from one moral 
 
is typically remedied by injunctive, rather than monetary, relief.”), cited with approval in Holabird & Root 
Architects Eng’rs Interiors v. Physicians Mgmt. of Ind., Inc., 94 C 1919, 1995 WL 248066, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 24, 1995); Bevan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 67 CIV 195, 1972 WL 19319, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
20, 1972); Stodart v. Mut. Film Corp., 249 F. 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.), aff’d, 249 F. 513 (2d Cir. 
1918) (per curiam). But see 6 PATRY, supra note 177, § 22:107 (disagreeing on the ground that “actual damages 
for copyright infringement should be awarded only for acts that constitute copyright infringement”). Cf. infra 
note 214 (noting the possibility of construing 17 U.S.C. § 1202 as creating a type of attribution right). Finally, 
the plaintiff may be able to recover, as an element of the infringer’s profits, the amount by which the infringement 
has increased the value of the defendant’s goodwill—though, as with damages for loss of goodwill, plaintiffs 
rarely if ever succeed in establishing this value. For discussion of the cases, see 4 NIMMER, supra note 177, 
§ 14.03[B][2][d]; cf. 6 PATRY, supra note 177, § 22:138 (arguing that “goodwill as a form of defendant’s profits 
confuses trademark with copyright law,” and is “inherently unquantifiable . . . inherently speculative”). 
 187. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 
909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002); Nunes v. Rushton, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1226, 1229 (D. Utah 2018); Kelley v. 
Universal Music Grp., No. 14 CIV. 2968 PAE, 2015 WL 6143737, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2015); Shell v. 
Henderson, No. 09-CV-00309-MSK-KMT, 2013 WL 4838907, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2013); Bollea v. 
Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329–30 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (ruling on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction and holding that only commercial harm, not privacy or emotional harm, would constitute “irreparable 
harm in the copyright sense”); Stern v. Does, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (evaluating whether 
the plaintiff filed a copyright action in bad faith and stating that, “their dubiousness aside,” plaintiff’s claims for 
emotional distress arising from alleged infringement are not “compensable under the Copyright Act”); 3 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 177, § 14.1.1.2; 4 NIMMER, supra note 177, § 14.02[C][2]; 6 PATRY, supra note 177, 
§ 22:108. 
 188. Nunes, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1216.  
 189. Id. at 1227. 
 190. Id. at 1229. 
 191. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 733. 
 192. Id. at 745. In Garcia, the defendant had cast the plaintiff in a cameo role in a film set in ancient Arabia. 
Id. at 737. Without her knowledge or consent, he then dubbed over her two lines and included her performance 
in an anti-Islam film titled Innocence of Muslims, after which the plaintiff received death threats. Id. at 737–38. 
The plaintiff filed suit for copyright infringement and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court 
denied. See id. at 738. Affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, because Garcia did not own a copyright in her 
performance, there was no likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at 740–44. In addition, for purposes of 
copyright law the asserted “damage to her reputation, unfair[,] forced promotion of a hateful Film, and death” 
did not constitute cognizable irreparable harm. Id. at 744–46 (alteration in original). 
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rights case discussed below)193 is Smith v. NBC Universal,194 in which the 
plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress resulting from the defendant’s 
unauthorized broadcast of a video showing the plaintiff being attacked by an 
orca.195 Disagreeing with the prevailing view, Judge Scheindlin opined that, 
where a person suffers “foreseeable emotional harm due to the infringement of 
a copyright on private materials,” such as the unauthorized distribution of a 
private diary, “compensation for emotional harm would be both just and in 
harmony with the plain language and intent of the statute.”196 The court 
nevertheless rejected the plaintiff’s claim for emotional damages on the grounds 
that emotional harm was not a foreseeable consequence of the broadcast, and 
that the jury might improperly award damages based on “the harm . . . suffered 
from the orca attack itself.”197 
D. MORAL RIGHTS 
The preceding Subpart discussed whether noneconomic damages for 
violation of what are sometimes referred to as the author’s “economic” rights.198 
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, an understanding of works of 
authorship as embodying the author’s unique personality had led courts and 
legislatures in continental Europe to recognize authors as having an additional 
set of personal, inalienable rights.199 Often referred to as “moral rights,” these 
include, among others, a “right of attribution”—generally, a right to be properly 
credited as the author of one’s own work—and a right referred to in English as 
the “right of integrity.”200 The precise content of these rights, in particular the 
integrity right, can vary a bit from one place to another. On one view, the right 
of integrity entitles the author to object to almost any use of her work that, 
 
 193. See infra Part II.D (discussing Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997 
(C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998)). 
 194. Smith v. NBC Universal, No. 06 CIV. 5350 (SAS), 2008 WL 483604 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008). 
 195. Id. at *1. 
 196. Id. at *1–2. Of course, in such a case the plaintiff also may have an actionable claim for invasion of 
privacy. 
 197. Id. at *2; see also Feldhacker v. Homes, 173 F. Supp. 3d 828, 836–37 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (holding that, 
“whether the Court applies the holding in Garcia that non-pecuniary, tort-like damages such as emotional 
distress damages are not available under the Copyright Act or the rationale used in Smith [sic] that emotional 
damages may be available under the Copyright Act only where such harm is foreseeable,” plaintiff’s claimed 
“emotional damage resulting from the distribution of building plans” was unforeseeable and thus not 
compensable). 
 198. See, e.g., WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 9–10 
(2016). 
 199. For discussion, see, for example, Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 6–15 (1997) and sources cited therein, and Susan P. Liemer, On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: 
How Non-Economic Rights Came to Be Protected in French IP Law, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 65, 101 (2011) 
(arguing that French courts had begun to recognize moral rights at an earlier point in time than is usually 
acknowledged). 
 200. See Cotter, supra note 199, at 11–12. 
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subjectively, she believes is contrary to her artistic or intellectual conception.201 
Other countries, however, have opted for an (arguably) more objective standard 
that focuses on acts that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.202 This 
latter type of standard is embodied in article 6 bis of the Berne Convention, an 
international copyright treaty, which obligates member states to confer upon 
authors the right “[i]ndependently of the author’s economic rights, and even after 
the transfer of the said rights . . . to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which 
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”203 
Lack of enthusiasm for the concept of moral rights was one of several 
reasons the United States delayed entry into the Berne Convention until 
1988204—and even then, it was two more years until Congress enacted a federal 
moral rights law, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).205 Unlike moral 
rights laws in many parts of the world, however—which generally apply to all 
types of works of authorship—VARA confers protection only upon qualifying 
“works of visual art.”206 These include paintings, sculptures, prints, and 
 
 201. See, e.g., Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 221 (1995). Even in countries adhering to this subjective view, however, such 
as France, there are some limits, for example with regard to motion picture adaptations and architectural works. 
See id. at 223; Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 364–67 (2006). 
 202. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 80 (UK) (“The author . . . has the right in 
the circumstances mentioned in this section not to have his work subjected to derogatory treatment,” defined as 
treatment amounting to a “distortion or mutilation of the work or [that] is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or 
reputation of the author”). The German approach falls somewhere in between the French and British. See 
Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights] Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESANZEIGER [BANZ], 
at 1273, § 14, as amended by Gesetz [G], Nov. 28, 2018, BANZ at 2014, art. 26 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html (“Der Urheber hat das Recht, eine Entstellung oder eine andere 
Beeinträchtigung seines Werkes zu verbieten, die geeignet ist, seine berechtigten geistigen oder persönlichen 
Interessen am Werk zu gefährden”) [“The author has the right to prohibit the distortion or any other derogatory 
treatment of his work which is capable of prejudicing his legitimate intellectual or personal interests in the 
work.”]. 
 203. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6 bis(1), July 24, 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 31. Another type of right, recognized to only a limited extent in the United States, is the “neighboring” 
or “related” right of entities such as performers to prevent or be compensated for acts such as the fixation, 
reproduction, distribution, and communication to the public of their performances. See WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty arts. 2(a), 5–10, 15, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights art. 14(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; International 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, arts. 3, 
7, 12, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; Council Directive 92/100, arts. 2, 4, 6–9, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC). The 
only neighboring right recognized under U.S. law is a right to prevent the unauthorized fixation of one’s live 
musical performance. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1). 
 204. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). For 
discussion of attempts to craft a U.S. law of moral rights before this time, see Cotter, supra note 199, at 15–20. 
 205. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601–10, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33 (1990) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 206. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”). In the United States, moral rights are also waivable; 
and for any qualifying works created on or after the statute’s effective date (June 1, 1991), they expire upon the 
author’s death. See id. § 106A(d)(1), (e)(1). For works created prior to that date, rights under VARA subsist for 
the duration of the copyright term, though only if the author retained title as of that date. See id. § 106A(d)(2). 
A few states also have enacted their own moral rights laws, however, see infra note 209, for which post-mortem 
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photographs produced for exhibition purposes only; all other works, including 
motion pictures and all works made for hire, are excluded from protection.207 
When applicable, VARA confers upon the author of a qualifying work both 
attribution and integrity rights; the latter includes the right “to prevent any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,” and “to prevent any destruction of 
a work of recognized stature.”208  
To date, only a handful of cases have addressed the types of damages 
available for violation of VARA rights.209 One issue that has arisen is whether 
the statute authorizes any damages remedy for certain types of moral rights 
violations. The confusion centers on the differences in the language creating the 
attribution right—which states that the author shall have the right “to claim 
 
protection may be available. For discussion, see Cambra E. Stern, A Matter of Life or Death: The Visual Artists 
Rights Act and the Problem of Postmortem Moral Rights, 51 UCLA L. REV. 849 (2004). 
 207. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 208. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 209. A few states, including New York and California, have their own moral rights laws. See CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 987 (West 2020); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2020). VARA generally preempts 
state moral rights laws to the extent they confer “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights 
conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A 
apply,” but not with regard to  
(A) any cause of action from undertakings commenced before the effective date set forth in 
[VARA];  
(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the rights conferred 
by section 106A with respect to works of visual art; or  
(C) activities violating legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the author.  
17 U.S.C. § 301(f). Unlike the federal legislation, the California and New York laws do not provide for statutory 
damages, but rather for actual (and, in appropriate cases, punitive) damages. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e) 
(providing for injunctions, actual and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and “[a]ny other relief which the court 
deems proper”); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(4)(a) (providing for “legal and injunctive relief”). The 
only case I am aware of under either statute that discusses damages is Wojnarowicz v. American Family 
Association. 745 F. Supp. 130, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (awarding one dollar in nominal damages, where the 
plaintiff “established that defendants’ actions were reasonably likely to result in damage to his reputation,” but 
proved “no actual damages,” in that “not one gallery or museum currently scheduled to exhibit plaintiff’s work 
has cancelled; nor has one planned sale been cancelled. Plaintiff presented no evidence that he has been harmed 
in any other specific, quantifiable way”). 
  By contrast, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has a moral rights statute that more closely resembles 
the European model by, inter alia, extending moral rights protection to all types of works. See Puerto Rico Moral 
Rights Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1401j–1401ff (2020). In several cases, courts have stated or held that 
prevailing plaintiffs under the Puerto Rican statute may recover damages for mental distress. See Estate of 
Leavitt-Rey v. Marrero-Gonzalez, Civ. No. 16-2769 (RAM), 2020 WL 6376649, at *8–9 (D.P.R. Oct. 30, 2020) 
(stating that the statute “provides recovery for mental suffering,” and awarding a default judgment of $50,000 
in statutory damages for moral rights violations relating to five songs); Berio-Ramos v. Flores-García, Civ. No. 
13-1879 (PAD), 2020 WL 2788504, at *12 (D.P.R. May 28, 2020) (citing Torres-Negrón v. Rivera, 413 F. Supp. 
2d 84, 85–87 (D.P.R. 2006)) (stating that the Puerto Rico Moral Rights Act “permits recovery for mental 
suffering”); Ferrer v. Mun. Gov’t of Lajas, Civ. No. 12-1030 (JAG), 2014 WL 12686916, at *3–4 (D.P.R. May 
22, 2014) (awarding $73,000 in actual damages, using the cost the defendant would incur to reinstall the 
plaintiff’s sculpture as a proxy for the “shock and humiliation the artist suffered”); Pancorbo v. Wometco de 
P.R., Inc., 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 650, 659–60 (1984) (stating that the measure of harm for violation of the author’s 
moral rights, under a predecessor statute, “is the spiritual and social damage sustained, paying heed to the fact 
that the author’s moral rights may vanish if the sanctions imposed are not sufficient”). 
1094 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1055 
authorship” of the work; to “prevent the use” of her name as the author of a work 
she didn’t create; and to “prevent the use” of her name on a work that has been 
distorted, mutilated, or modified in a manner prejudicial to her honor or 
reputation210—and the language creating the integrity right, which states that the 
author shall have the right:  
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of 
that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and 
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a 
violation of that right, and  
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any 
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that 
right.211 
The First Circuit has concluded that the additional language found in the 
integrity clauses (“and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or 
modification . . . is a violation of that right,” “and any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of the work is a violation of that right”212) implies that a 
damages remedy is available for violations of these rights only; by contrast, 
where the statute confers only a right to “prevent,” this implies that the author 
has a right to an injunction but not damages.213 Although the decision has been 
criticized for adopting a somewhat tortured interpretation of the text,214 the issue 
does not appear to have arisen in any other cases so far.  
Courts in a few other cases have awarded damages for violation of VARA’s 
integrity right. For example, in Martin v. City of Indianapolis,215 the district 
court awarded $20,000 in statutory damages (at the time, the maximum amount 
of statutory damages allowed for non-willful infringement) for the destruction 
of a sculptural work, stating: 
[T]he loss Martin sustained is incalculable and substantial, in fact, the most 
extreme form of copyright infringement possible: total destruction. Martin 
devoted an estimated 1,300 hours to the construction of Symphony # 1, a 
massive stainless steel sculpture, spanning a period of 2 ½ years on weekends 
and holidays. The sculpture was well-regarded by art critics and the public, 
 
 210. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(1)(A)–(B), (2). 
 211. Id. § 106A(a)(3). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Mass. Museum of Contemp. Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing 
NIMMER, supra note 177, § 8D.06[B][1]). 
 214. See 6 PATRY, supra note 177, § 16:46. Of course, an injunction would not do much good once a work 
already has been destroyed or irremediably altered. Note that an arguably more expansive attribution right exists, 
whether so intended by Congress or not, by way of a provision of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1) (making it unlawful to “intentionally remove or alter any copyright management 
information”); id. § 1202(c)(2) (including within the definition of “copyright management information” the 
author’s name); id. § 1203(c)(2) (providing for actual damages or statutory damages “in the sum of not less than 
$2,500 or more than $25,000”); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: 
EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 87 (2019), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/ 
full-report.pdf (noting that courts have applied § 1202 to analog as well as to digital works). 
 215. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 4 F. Supp. 2d 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998), aff’d, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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and its destruction caused the irreparable loss of an important part of Martin’s 
artistic reputation and legacy. The magnitude of the loss alone supports an 
award of $20,000 to Martin. 
  In addition, the manner in which the City infringed Martin’s rights under 
VARA, while not rising to the level of willful infringement, nevertheless 
exhibited a complete disregard for the City’s contractual obligations to Martin 
under the Project Agreement as well as Martin’s ownership claim in the 
sculpture. In this case, the City had no colorable claim to ownership or the 
right to destroy Symphony # 1. An award of full statutory damages also has 
strong deterrent value, informing the City that destruction of works of art like 
Symphony # 1 is not acceptable behavior under the law or in the eyes of the 
public.216 
In another decision rendered two months later, Hanrahan v. Ramirez, a 
court entered a default judgment in favor of an artist whose mural (painted with 
consent of the building owner) had been destroyed by the defendant, a tenant 
that operated a liquor store.217 Citing the author’s testimony that the destruction 
had harmed her reputation and inflicted emotional harm,218 the court awarded 
$15,000 for these injuries, along with another $15,000 to fund a restoration 
project.219 And in another more recent case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a 
statutory damages award of $120,000 for the destruction of four works of visual 
art.220  
The largest award to date, however, was entered in Castillo v. G&M Realty 
L.P.,221 the 5Pointz graffiti art case noted in the Introduction. On the issue of 
damages, the district judge declined to award actual damages based on the 
plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony that each of the destroyed murals was worth 
between $50,000 and $80,000.222 Finding the expert’s methodology flawed, the 
court instead credited the defendant’s expert, who “testified that because of the 
unique challenges and costs of selling those artworks . . . which were the size of 
a building wall,” the works had no “provable market value.”223 The court also 
concluded, based on the Kelley and Garcia cases discussed in the preceding 
 
 216. Id. at 811–12 (citations omitted). 
 217. Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998). 
 218. See id. at *5–6 (citing testimony that the damage to the mural—which conveyed the message “It’s not 
cool to target kids” to buy tobacco and alcohol—had harmed the artist’s “career by conveying the message that 
this type of art does not matter,” that the artist often obtained work through observations of her prior work, and 
that the controversy had taken an emotional toll). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Narkiewicz-Laine v. Doyle, 930 F.3d 897, 899, 903–06 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 221. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), aff’g sub nom. Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 
320 F. Supp. 3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020).  
 222. See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 441–42.   
 223. Id. It’s not altogether clear, though, exactly how the works’ market value would be relevant. The 
plaintiffs clearly had copyright and moral rights interests in the works, but were they also the owners of the 
physical paintings? Note, however, that there was testimony that many of the works were (prior to their 
obliteration) at least partially removable (for example, because painted on plywood). See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 
3d at 444 & n.19.  
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Subpart,224 that damages for emotional distress are not recoverable under 
VARA, because “VARA provides damages under ‘the same standards that the 
courts presently use’ under traditional copyright law.”225 Stating, however, that 
“statutory damages are particularly appropriate ‘when no actual damages are 
proven or they are difficult to calculate,’”226 and are intended to be deterrent as 
well as compensatory or restitutionary,227 the court awarded $6.75 million in 
statutory damages.228 This amounted to $150,000 for each work of recognized 
stature—the maximum allowed under the statute for willful infringement—
based on the court’s finding that the destruction was, indeed, willful (“an act of 
pure pique and revenge for the nerve of the plaintiffs to sue to attempt to prevent 
the destruction of their art”),229 and its evaluation of several other factors 
including, “as perhaps the most important factor,” deterrence.230 In 2020, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the judgment in every respect.231 
E. PATENTS  
A patent is a grant of rights in a novel, useful, and nonobvious invention.232 
More precisely, a valid patent entitles the owner to exclude (or demand 
compensation from) others for the manufacture, use, or sale of the patented 
subject matter, beginning on the date the patent issues and ending twenty years 
from the date the patent application was filed.233 Similar to copyrights, the 
principal justification for granting patents is to encourage the creation and 
disclosure of subject matter from which the public benefits.234  
For the infringement of a valid patent, courts have discretion to award 
injunctive relief.235 In addition, the Patent Act entitles the prevailing patent 
owner to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event 
 
 224. See supra notes 187, 191–192 and accompanying text. 
 225. Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 442 n.18 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21–22 (1990)). The court also 
found no basis for an award of defendant’s profits. See id. at 441 n.16. 
 226. Id. at 443 (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 227. Id. (citing Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 228. Id. at 447–48.  
 229. Id. at 443, 445. 
 230. See id. at 445–47. The court also noted, among other things, that the defendant profited indirectly from 
being able to proceed with the projected condominium development. Id. at 446. The complete list of relevant 
factors under Second Circuit law include  
(1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) 
the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; 
(5) the infringer’s cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing 
material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties. 
Id. at 445 (quoting Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 231. See Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020).  
 232. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 271. The United States also grants a form of patent protection for novel, 
nonobvious, ornamental designs, see id. § 171(a), and patents or patent-like protection for certain new varieties 
of plants, see id. §§ 161–64; 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582. 
 233. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a). 
 234. See COTTER, supra note 46, at 37–40. 
 235. See 35 U.S.C. § 283; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006). 
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less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer.”236 The statute also authorizes courts to “increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed,”237 though the case law limits this 
grant of authority to cases involving willful infringement or other egregious 
behavior.238  
Although the “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement” 
usually consist of either lost profits or, as the statute indicates, a reasonable 
royalty,239 as a general matter courts allow the patent owner to recover 
compensation for other losses proximately caused by the infringement.240 For 
example, in Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp.,241 the defendant marketed 
“Classpak” lamps that infringed a smaller competitor’s patent.242 The district 
court awarded lost profits on past sales that the plaintiff would have made, but 
for the infringement, as well as “price erosion” damages to make up for price 
reductions instituted to compete with the defendant.243 More relevant for present 
purposes, however, the district court also awarded damages for lost future profits 
the plaintiff would have made, reasoning that: 
[Lam’s] ability to compete against a giant was almost destroyed because of 
the trade’s belief that Lam had nothing to sell which wasn’t available from 
defendant. . . . On top of all of this, the record shows that the hastily developed 
CLASSPAK didn’t work very well, and the entire concept of the fixture 
received a bad name. The market reasoned that if the giant couldn’t make a 
good product, the pygmy surely couldn’t.  
. . . . 
. . . I find that had it not been for the infringement, sales would have grown at 
about the same prior rate to a sales figure of $1,150,000 and that plaintiff’s 
profit thereon would be 25%.244 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that this award was 
“based on mere speculation or conjecture,”245 noting that “J-M’s hastily-
developed CLASSPAKs seriously damaged Lam’s goodwill. Since these 
fixtures didn’t work very well, the customers developed doubts concerning the 
entire concept.”246 As a result, Lam is sometimes cited for the proposition that, 
where appropriate, courts may award damages for lost future profits and/or 
damages to compensate for loss of goodwill caused by an act of patent 
 
 236. 35 U.S.C. § 284. For design patent infringement, courts may award the infringer’s profits in lieu of 
actual damages. See id. § 289; Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433–34 (2016). 
 237. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 238. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016). 
 239. See COTTER, supra note 46, at 246–47. 
 240. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 241. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed Cir. 1983). 
 242. See id. at 1058–59. 
 243. See id. at 1059. 
 244. Id. at 1063. 
 245. Id. at 1067. 
 246. Id. at 1068. 
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infringement.247 There appear to be no other cases affirming such awards,248 
however, and no cases addressing whether courts may award damages to an 
individual patent owner for emotional distress suffered as a result of the 
infringement.249  
F. E.U. LAW 
An interesting point of comparison with the legal standards discussed 
above can be found in the law of the European Union (E.U.). As noted in the 
Introduction, article 13(1) of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
Directive (IPRED) states that, in awarding damages for the infringement of IP 
rights, the judicial authorities of member states “shall take into account all 
appropriate aspects, such as the negative economic consequences, including lost 
profits, which the injured party has suffered, any unfair profits made by the 
infringer and, in appropriate cases, elements other than economic factors, such 
as the moral prejudice caused to the rightsholder.”250 On its face, the Directive 
appears to require courts across the E.U. to render awards of noneconomic 
damages, as appropriate, across the full range of IP cases.251 
 
 247. See Christopher B. Seaman, Thomas F. Cotter, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse & Masabumi 
Suzuki, Lost Profits and Disgorgement, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL 
CONSENSUS, supra note 9, at 50, 71; JOHN SKENYON, CHRISTOPHER MARCHESE & JOHN LAND, PATENT 
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:7 (rev. ed. 2020). 
 248. See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting the argument 
that plaintiff was entitled to any additional compensation resulting from the defendant’s goodwill having 
increased in value as a result of the infringement, on the ground that any such benefit was already taken into 
account in setting a reasonable royalty rate); TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 532 (D. 
Del. 2008) (“Defendant has taken from plaintiff not only this important business, but the recognition of being a 
technology innovator and the first global supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount of 
business opportunities flowing therefrom. Such harms are not compensable in damages.”) (footnote omitted). 
On the other hand, to the extent an act of patent infringement threatens to harm the owner’s reputation for being 
an innovator, or to mislead consumers into thinking that the defendant’s lower-quality, infringing product is an 
acceptable substitute for the plaintiff’s, these effects may qualify as “irreparable harm” in support of injunctive 
relief. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 652–56 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, J., concurring); 
Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 249. Cf. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[R]emote consequences, such 
as a heart attack of the inventor or loss in value of shares of common stock of a patentee corporation caused 
indirectly by infringement are not compensable.”). I also am not aware of any U.S. cases involving other bodies 
of IP law, such as trade secrets, in which these issues have arisen. 
 250. IPRED, supra note 17, art. 13(1) (emphasis added). 
 251. Although the Directive itself does not expressly define “intellectual property,” it does state that the 
term includes “industrial property,” id. art. 2, which is defined in the Paris Convention as including “patents, 
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations 
of origin, and the repression of unfair competition.” Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
art. 1 para. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979); see also Phillip 
Johnson, ‘Damages’ in European Law and the Traditional Accounts of Profit, 3 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 
296, 297 (2013) (suggesting that, under the Directive, breach of confidence and passing off would not be 
included within the definition of intellectual property). There also is no precise counterpart to the right of 
publicity under E.U. law or the domestic laws of its current or former member states, although several members 
recognize something akin to a right of publicity under, variously, the law of breach of confidence or passing 
off—see, for example, Fenty v. Arcadia Group Brands Ltd. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 3 [29], [33] (Eng.); the right to 
one’s image—see, for example, Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the 
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Moreover, damages for moral prejudice can be awarded even when the 
owner also seeks economic damages. The leading case is a 2016 decision of the 
Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU), Liffers v. Producciones 
Mandarina SL.252 In Liffers, the plaintiff owned a copyright interest in a motion 
picture titled Dos patrias, Cuba y la noche, which presented “six personal and 
intimate stories concerning various homosexual or transsexual inhabitants of 
Havana.”253 Without authorization, the defendant produced a documentary 
about child prostitution in Cuba that included certain portions taken from Dos 
patrias, Cuba y la noche.254 The plaintiff filed suit and requested damages under 
article 140(2) of the Spanish Intellectual Property Code, which states: 
  The damages for prejudice shall be set, at the option of the injured party, in 
accordance with one of the following criteria: 
  (a)  The negative economic consequences, including lost profits suffered 
by the injured party and profits obtained by the infringing party through the 
unlawful use. Where there is moral prejudice, this shall be compensated even 
if no economic prejudice has been proven. For the purposes of quantification, 
account shall be taken of the circumstances of the infringement, the severity 
of the injury suffered and the degree of unlawful dissemination of the work. 
  (b)  The amount which the injured party would have received as payment, 
if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property 
right in question.255 
More specifically, the plaintiff sought economic damages in the form of a 
hypothetical royalty under article 140(2)(b), as well as damages for moral 
prejudice under article 140(2)(a). The court of first instance awarded damages 
under both headings, but the appellate court reversed on the ground that the two 
methods of calculation were mutually exclusive.256 The Supreme Court then 
 
Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 681–86 (2002) (discussing how “image rights” under French law 
provide recourse against both patrimonial (economic) and nonpatrimonial (noneconomic) harm resulting from 
the unauthorized use of one’s image); or the “general right to personality” (allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht)—
see Susanne Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and Germany: A Comparative Analysis, 19 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L.J. 479, 502–03 (1999) (noting, inter alia, that the general right of personality protects both 
individuals and corporate entities against unauthorized exposure and applies when the more specific rights to 
one’s name or image do not). Finally, as noted previously, the Trade Secrets Directive lists “moral prejudice” in 
its provision specifying the types of damages that member nations must accord for trade secret misappropriation. 
See Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 17, art. 14(2). But see Case C-280/15, Nikolajeva v. Multi Protect OÜ, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:467, ¶¶ 20, 57 (June 22, 2016) (holding that moral prejudice damages are not available for the 
unauthorized use of a European trademark prior to its registration, under article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 207/2009). 
 252. Case C-99/15, Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina SL, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, ¶ 17 (Mar. 17, 2016). For 
a more detailed discussion of the relevant facts, in an article published just prior to the CJEU’s decision, see 
Marc Simon Altaba, Take It or Leave It—The Unclear Situation of Moral Damage Claims in Spanish Intellectual 
Property Law, 47 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 178 (2016). 
 253. Liffers, Case C-99/15, ¶ 6. 
 254. Id. ¶ 7. 
 255. Id. ¶ 5 (quoting Ley de Propiedad Intelectual [Law on Intellectual Property] art. 140(2) (B.O.E. 1996, 
97) (Spain)). 
 256. See id. ¶ 10. 
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referred the question to the CJEU, which concluded that article 13(1) of the 
Directive:  
must be interpreted as permitting a party injured by an intellectual property 
infringement, who claims compensation for his material damage as 
calculated . . . on the basis of the amount of royalties or fees which would have 
been due to him if the infringer had requested his authorisation to use that 
right, also to claim compensation for the moral prejudice that he has 
suffered.”257 
Consistent with Liffers, courts within the E.U. have indicated that damages 
may be awarded for moral prejudice for violations of copyright, neighboring 
rights, and moral rights.258 Courts in Germany and the United Kingdom, 
however, do not frequently award damages to compensate for an author’s 
emotional harm;259 and when European courts do award damages for moral 
 
 257. Id., operative part.  
 258. See, e.g., GERHARD SCHRICKER, URHEBERRECHT [COPYRIGHT] § 97, at 1534 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing 
damages for immaterial harm under German copyright and moral rights law); 2 HUGH LADDIE, PETER PRESCOTT 
& MARY VITORIA, THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 63.32 (4th ed. 2011) (collecting cases 
under the law of England (which, however, is no longer part of the E.U. as of 2021) and other Commonwealth 
countries); Johnson, supra note 186 (discussing damages for reputational harm for copyright infringement, 
primarily under English and Australian law); Paul Torremans, Compensation for Intellectual Property 
Infringement: Admissibility of Punitive Damages and Compensation for Moral Prejudice, 40 E.I.P.R. 797, 800 
(2018). But see José Cabrera Rodríguez, Daño Moral por Infracción de Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual 
[Moral Damage for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights], 57 PE.I. REVISTA DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL 
13 (2017) (arguing, against the authority of some Spanish commentators, that damages for moral prejudice 
should be available for the infringement of an author’s economic rights as well as her moral rights). For 
discussion of neighboring rights, see supra note 203. 
 259. For example, in Henderson v. All Around the World Recordings Ltd., [2014] EWHC 3087 (Eng.), the 
court denied the plaintiff’s request for moral prejudice damages for violation of her performers’ rights, stating: 
I do not think that art.13(1)(a) was intended to introduce the widely applicable payment of an extra 
lump sum to claimants who prove knowing infringement and claim moral prejudice. Nor do I think 
that such a right depends on the claimant having had a sufficiently strong emotional reaction to the 
infringement. Generally it will be impossible for a court to assess the true strength of a defendant’s 
emotions on any relevant scale, if there is one. 
  In my view, the moral prejudice contemplated by art.13(1)(a) is confined to prejudice arising in 
limited circumstances, in particular where the claimant suffers little or no financial loss and would 
either be left with no compensation unless the moral prejudice were taken into account, or the 
compensation would not be proportionate to the overall damage suffered where this includes 
significant moral prejudice. For instance, if a defendant were to infringe the copyright in photographs 
disclosing private grief by publishing them on the internet, that may generate no profit for the 
defendant and no financial loss for the copyright owner. 
Id. ¶¶ 93–94. But see Jane Cornwell, Injunctions and Monetary Remedies Compared: The English Judicial 
Response to the IP Enforcement Directive, 40 E.I.P.R. 490, 496 (2018) (noting that in a subsequent decision, 
Absolute Lofts South West London Ltd. v. Artisan Home Improvements Ltd., [2015] EWHC 2608 (Eng.), Justice 
Hacon suggested that IPRED article 13(1) contemplates “a looser limitation than the English concept of strictly 
compensatory damages”); cf. ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS §§ 9.199–9.200 (2006) (stating that, under German law, authors 
who suffer damage for the infringement of a moral right may recover economic damages, but that noneconomic 
damages (Schmerzensgeld) are awarded only in cases involving “serious and enduring harm”); SCHRICKER, 
supra note 258, § 97, at 1534 (similar). 
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prejudice, the awards often (though not always) are for small sums.260 A variety 
of factors may be relevant in determining the amount, including (under German 
law) “the ongoing significance of the infringement to the author and his 
reputation,” “the intention of the infringer, the scale of the infringement, the 
artistic standing of the work in question, and the existence of other means of 
undoing the harm.”261 The same considerations would be relevant for violation 
of the general right to personality, as would (under appropriate circumstances) 
the need to deter future violations.262 The various countries also differ among 
themselves on the question of whether damages for moral prejudice are available 
to corporate entities as well as natural persons, as well as whether such damages 
can be awarded to the authors’ heirs.263  
 
 260. See ADENEY, supra note 259, § 8.160, at 210 (stating that, under French law, “[d]amages for 
infringement of the moral rights may extend from the nominal, where the main harm is to authorial feelings, to 
the very substantial;” that “[i]t is by no means unusual for only 1 franc (or euro) to be awarded;” but that “[o]n 
the other hand, an award of €1 million is not unknown”); 2 LADDIE ET AL., supra note 258, § 63.32 (citing 
Nichols Advanced Vehicle Systems Inc. v. Rees, [1979] RPC 127 for the proposition that “a moderate but not 
excessive sum” is appropriate, but also noting that “quite large sums have been regarded as appropriate” in 
others); see also Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 4e ch., Sept. 8, 2004, 04/09673 (Fr.) 
(awarding €1 million for violation of film director’s moral rights in an ad campaign); OBERLANDESGERICHT 
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Feb. 23, 1995 (Ger.) (Herrenmagazin) (awarding DM 10,000 for publishing 
distorted version of author’s work in a men’s magazine); Jani McCutcheon, Dead Loss: Damages for 
Posthumous Breach of the Moral Right of Integrity, 40 MELB. U. L. REV. 240, 279 n.214, 281–82, 282 n.221 
(2016) (noting some substantial damages awards for moral rights violations in France, as well as one in Canada). 
  A 2019 decision of the Tokyo District Court suggests that Japanese law follows similar principles. The 
plaintiff had filed suit in response to the use of one of his photographs on an adult website. The court awarded a 
judgment in the amount of ¥32,400 (a little over $300) as lost profits for infringement of his copyright, and 
¥300,000 (about $2,900) for emotional harm for violation of his moral rights. The court expressed doubt whether 
damages for emotional distress would generally be appropriate for non-moral rights copyright infringement, 
though it did not clearly rule out such a possibility. See Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 30, 2019, 
2019 (Wa) no. 15601 (Japan), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EBsJJOISxccadxHBpl-
EhIn6oplalBnt/view?usp=sharing; Yasufumi Shiroyama, Outline of the IP-related Judgments Handed Down by 
Japanese Courts in the Second Half of 2019, 45 A.I.P.P.I. JAPAN 159, 168 (2020). I thank Professor Masubumi 
Suzuki for assistance in understanding this case. 
 261. ADENEY, supra note 259, § 9.201; see also SCHRICKER, supra note 258, § 97, at 1534–35. 
 262. See, e.g., DANIEL MUNDHENKE, RECHTSDOGMATISCHE UND RECHTSPOLITISCHE BEDEUTUNG DER 
SCHMERZENSGELDRECHTSPRECHUNG BEI VERLETZUNGEN DES ALLGEMEINEN PERSÖNLICHKEITSRECHTS DURCH 
PRESSEORGANE [DOCTRINAL AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASELAW ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR 
INFRINGEMENTS OF THE GENERAL RIGHT TO PERSONALITY BY THE MEDIA] 38–40 (2006); SCHRICKER, supra 
note 258, § 97, at 1533; see also Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595 (Eng.), aff’d on other grounds, 
[2007] UKHL 21 (affirming an award of £3,750 for mental distress for breach of confidence in a case involving 
unauthorized publication of celebrity wedding photos, rejecting a request for £125,000 for a notional license, 
and suggesting that in an appropriate case an award of defendant’s profits might be appropriate). 
 263. See, e.g., ADENEY, supra note 259, at § 9.202 (stating that the authors’ heirs do not have a right to 
noneconomic damages in Germany); Bergmann, supra note 251, at 502 (noting that German law permits 
corporations to assert the general personality right); Federico López Carreras, Las personas jurídicas y el daño 
moral en Francia/Les personnes morales et le préjudice moral en France (Legal Persons and Moral Damage 
in France/Legal Persons and Moral Prejudice in France), REVISTA AEQUITAS VIRTUAL, https://p3.usal.edu.ar/ 
index.php/aequitasvirtual/article/viewFile/3994/4954 (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (collecting French case law 
permitting legal entities to recover moral damages); Philippe Pierre, L’indemnisation du prejudíce moral en 
Droit français (Compensation for Moral Prejudice Under French Law) (unpublished manscript), 
http://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/prejudice_moral_etude-fr.pdf (last 
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Subject to this last-mentioned qualification, commentators generally 
appear to agree that, under the Directive, damages for noneconomic harm, 
including moral prejudice, also are available for the violation of other IP rights, 
including trademarks264 and patents—though in the latter context, the concept 
has met with varying interpretations: 
Moral prejudice has barely any constancy between European jurisdictions 
even under the Enforcement Directive, and so there is no clear line to follow. 
All of the above-mentioned jurisdictions, with the exception of Germany, 
have it as an available claim, though it is rare (to an extreme) in the 
Netherlands, and England and Wales. In France, while theoretically tied to 
reputation, it appears to be used as a mechanism to adjust the quantum 
equitably. In Italy, moral prejudice must be demonstrated (essentially, damage 
to reputation), and then quantified as up to as much of 50 per cent of the loss 
of profits.265 
Nevertheless, in one recent decision, the Court of Appeal of Madrid held 
that “moral damages” (daño moral)—including “psychological suffering or 
distress, which is considered to exist in a variety of situations such as 
psychological or spiritual shock or suffering, helplessness, worry (as a mental 
sensation of disquiet, sorrow, fear or foreboding uncertainty), anxiety, anguish, 
uncertainty, shock, affliction and other similar situations”—are in theory 
compensable in a patent infringement action, though in the actual case the 
plaintiff had not proven the necessary facts to sustain them on this ground.266 
The court affirmed an award of moral damages for “loss of prestige,” however, 
based on evidence that the infringing product—a beaded thong used for sexual 
 
visited Apr. 19, 2021) (discussing recent French case law rejecting an assertion of the right to one’s image on 
behalf of a deceased person, but noting that moral rights persist postmortem). 
 264. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Measures and 
Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, at 9, COM (2003) 46 final (Jan. 1, 2003) 
(“The phenomenon of counterfeiting and piracy leads to businesses losing turnover and market shares (loss of 
direct sales) which they have sometimes had difficulty acquiring, not to mention the intangible losses and the 
moral prejudice they suffer because of the loss in terms of brand image with their customers (loss of future sales). 
The spread of counterfeit and pirated products in fact leads to a prejudicial downgrading of the reputation and 
originality of the genuine products particularly when businesses gear their publicity to the quality and rarity of 
their products.”); PAUL LANGE, MARKEN- UND KENNZEICHENRECHT § 9, at 1392 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that 
German courts may award noneconomic damages for trademark infringement, where economic damages or other 
measures would not fully compensate). 
 265. Fox et al., supra note 18, at 572–73. Note, however, that the reference to French courts awarding 
damages for moral prejudice “to adjust the quantum equitably” or, as the authors put it elsewhere, to “round up” 
the damages amount, may no longer be accurate. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] com., Jan. 23, 2019, No. 16-28322, D. 41900041 (Fr.), https://juricaf.org/arret/FRANCE-
COURDECASSATION-20190123-1628322 (reversing an award of damages for moral prejudice, on the ground 
that the plaintiff had not proven harm to its reputation). In addition, German courts may award damages for 
“market confusion” (Marktverwirrung) resulting from an act of patent infringement. See THOMAS F. COTTER, 
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 262 & n.160 (2013) (citing sources). 
 266. See A.P., Jan. 15, 2016 (R.G.D., No. 2272) (Spain); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Damages for Moral 
Prejudice in Spain and Elsewhere, COMPAR. PAT. REMEDIES (June 20, 2016), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2016/06/damages-for-moral-prejudice-in-spain.html (quoting a 
translation by Miquel Montañá). 
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stimulation—was of lower quality than the plaintiff’s product, having been 
presented “in simple cardboard boxes as opposed to the luxury image attributed 
to the products of the complainant.”267 
III.  SHOULD NONECONOMIC DAMAGES BE RECOVERABLE IN IP CASES?  
As the preceding Parts show, courts in the United States generally have 
been receptive, at least in theory, to awarding IP owners damages for harm to 
reputation or goodwill—though such awards have been rare outside of 
trademark and right of publicity cases, and the standards for quantifying the 
harm are not always clear. On the other hand, federal and state courts have been 
mostly unwilling to award damages for emotional harm in IP cases other than 
those involving the privacy-based right of publicity. E.U. law, by contrast, 
appears to contemplate awards for moral prejudice, as the facts warrant, in all of 
the various bodies of IP law, although the receptivity of individual courts varies 
from one member state to another.  
In this Part, I review the principal arguments scholars have advanced for 
and against awarding damages for noneconomic harm in other areas of law, 
before turning to the question of whether courts should award these damages in 
IP cases specifically. I will argue that, as a general matter, the purpose of the 
body of law at issue should be an important (in some cases, decisive) 
consideration. Second, however, I will argue that measurement problems 
warrant caution in awarding noneconomic damages even when recovery 
otherwise would seem consistent with, or at least not clearly detrimental to, the 
purpose of the body of law in issue. I conclude with a set of five 
recommendations for setting the amount of the award, in cases in which 
noneconomic damages are or should be cognizable.   
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As discussed in Part I, some bodies of law are specifically intended to 
protect either reputational interests (for example, defamation law), emotional 
well-being (for example, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress), or both (for example, privacy).268 The fact that these bodies of law exist 
reflects a policy judgment that reputational and emotional harms sometimes 
merit relief; their specific contours reflect varying judgments about how best to 
balance the competing interests of the victim in avoiding these harms with the 
interests of the general public (for example, in not being chilled from speaking 
truthfully).269 These latter concerns have led to the imposition of various 
 
 267. See A.P., Jan. 15, 2016 (R.G.D., No. 2272) (Spain); Cotter, supra note 266 (quoting a translation by 
Miquel Montañá). 
 268. See supra notes 47–61, 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Heymann, supra note 3, at 1418, 1424 (noting that defamation law does not protect the plaintiff’s 
interest in maintaining a false reputation). 
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conditions that must be present for these types of claims to be cognizable, and 
sometimes limitations on the appropriate scope of the recovery as well.270 
In certain other bodies of law, by contrast, reputational or emotional harm 
may not qualify as a cognizable injury at all. As also noted in Part I, for example, 
the general rule at common law was that courts would award only economic 
damages for torts directed against real or personal property.271 As a matter of 
policy, such a rule might be justified if one had reason to believe that (1) the ex 
ante probability that a victim would suffer reputational or substantial272 
emotional harm from the invasion of a property interest is sufficiently low that 
the doctrine of proximate cause normally would preclude recovery for these 
injuries,273 and (2) the error and adjudication costs that would result if courts 
permitted victims to try to pursue such claims would outweigh the occasional 
benefit.274 (Alternatively, if either premise is unsound, courts might be justified 
in departing from the common law rule, as some of them have done in recent 
years.275) Similarly, courts have interpreted § 4 of the Clayton Act, which 
authorizes a civil action by “any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,”276 as precluding 
the recovery of damages for emotional distress, on the textual ground that this 
 
 270. See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text (discussing the availability, or not, of presumed and 
general damages in defamation law). 
 271. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 272. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. d (AM. 
L. INST. 2012) (noting that “some degree of emotional harm must be expected in social interaction and tolerated 
without legal recourse,” and that for purposes of the emotional distress torts “an actor is liable only if the conduct 
goes beyond the bounds of human decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community. 
Ordinary insults and indignities are not enough for liability to be imposed, even if the actor desires to cause 
emotional harm”); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
1, 71 n.314 (2001) (precluding liability may be sensible when there is “a very low probability that a particular 
class of damages will be substantial . . . because liability will not affect the defendant’s ex ante behavior”) (citing 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 
109, 124–29 (1983)). 
 273. One explanation for limiting liability to injuries that were proximately caused (not just caused-in-fact) 
by a defendant’s breach of duty is that, when the breach does not materially increase the ex ante probability of 
the injury occurring, “the social costs of imposing liability may exceed the social benefit of a reduction in injury, 
because the imposition of liability when the probability of injury is very low will have little if any ex ante 
deterrent effect, and may impose substantial administrative costs.” Blair & Cotter, supra note 272, at 71 & nn. 
313–14 (first citing Landes & Posner, supra note 272, at 119–23, 125–34; and then citing Steven Shavell, An 
Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 481, 484, 490–93 
(1980)); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use in Oracle: Proximate Cause at the Copyright/Patent Divide, 100 
B.U. L. REV. 389, 397–98, 417–21 (2020) (discussing proximate cause). 
 274. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 161–62, 179 (2018) 
(noting that presumptions sometimes can reduce adjudication and error costs). A similar rationale might support 
other legal doctrines, such as the economic loss doctrine’s limitation on the recovery of damages for economic 
losses caused by a negligent injury to another’s property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
ECONOMIC HARM § 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2018); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
§ 6.7, at 213–15 (9th ed. 2014). 
 275. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 276. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
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type of harm is not an injury to “business or property.”277 This limitation also 
would seem consistent with the broader principle, under which a private plaintiff 
must be able to articulate how the challenged conduct threatens it with “antitrust 
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”278  
In between these two extremes are those bodies of law that are not intended 
primarily to protect reputation or emotional health but do not clearly preclude 
such recoveries either. When such injuries arise from violations of these other 
bodies of law, the question is whether (and if so, how) they should be redressed. 
Of possible relevance here, if only by way of analogy, is a body of scholarly 
literature addressing whether, or to what extent, courts in personal injury cases 
should award victims compensation for the intangible pain and suffering they 
incur as a result of a defendant’s breach of duty.279 The most obvious argument 
in favor of allowing such awards is that pain and suffering are real phenomena 
that often accompany physical injury, so that if plaintiffs are limited to their 
economic losses (lost wages, bills, and so on) they will not be fully compensated. 
Full compensation, in turn, might seem desirable from the standpoint of both 
restorative justice and optimal deterrence: the former because, absent full 
compensation, victims will not be fully restored; the latter because potential 
defendants otherwise will not fully internalize the external harm resulting from 
their conduct.280 Alternatively, some observers have posited that awards for pain 
 
 277. See Note, Consumer Standing to Sue for Treble Damages, 93 HARV. L. REV. 228, 232 n.32 (1979) (first 
citing Young v. Colonial Oil Co., 451 F. Supp. 360 (M.D. Ga. 1978); and then citing Hamman v. United States, 
267 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mont. 1967), appeal dismissed, 399 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1968)); see also Frankenfield v. 
Kennebec Bean Co., No. Civ.A. CV-01-636, 2002 WL 1978904, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. June 24, 2002) (finding 
no recovery for emotional distress under state or federal antitrust laws); L’Altrella v. Weight Watchers Int’l, No. 
CV 950334348, 1998 WL 166467, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1998) (same). 
 278. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). As Professor Brodley notes, 
in theory the antitrust injury requirement “screens the economic interests of the plaintiff to assure that a disabling 
conflict of interest or other motivation inconsistent with competition does not hamper plaintiff’s capacity to 
serve the public interest”—for example, by enabling the plaintiff to “collect damages for losses that stem from 
competition,” a result that “would undermine the very purpose of those laws.” Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust 
Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 5, 18–21 (1995); see also Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (stating 
that the antitrust injury requirement “ensures that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale 
for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place”). Even when emotional harm results from conduct 
that subverts competition, it doesn’t correspond to the rationale for finding that conduct to violate the antitrust 
laws. 
 279. Some of the literature cited in the discussion that follows addresses not only damages for physical pain 
and suffering, however, but also mental distress. In addition, other scholars have engaged arguments similar to 
those recited above in discussing whether noneconomic damages should be available in non-tort contexts, such 
as breach of contract. See, e.g., Sebert, supra note 37, at 1570. 
 280. See, e.g., Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.); Ronen Avraham, 
Does the Theory of Insurance Support Awarding Pain and Suffering Damages in Torts?, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 94, 96 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015); 
Rabin, supra note 5, at 374–75. Rabin notes further that the common law has long awarded noneconomic 
damages for a variety of claims, as discussed in Part I above. See id. at 362–67. For a somewhat different take 
on the deterrence point, however, see Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135, 1178–79 (2003) (arguing that, from an economic perspective, if a “number happens 
1106 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1055 
and suffering provide “solace,” or at least some symbolic recognition that the 
defendant has committed a wrong against the plaintiff for which atonement is 
appropriate.281  
To be sure, not everyone is convinced. Critics have been quick to point out, 
among other things, that money doesn’t really restore the plaintiff to a state of 
the world in which her pain and suffering no longer exists,282 and that the optimal 
deterrence theory falters if awards are so unpredictable or inconsistent that they 
induce potential tortfeasors to take excessive precautions.283 Relatedly, critics 
assert that pain and suffering can be easy to feign, and that awards can seem 
arbitrary (and thus potentially lacking in horizontal and vertical equity).284 Some 
empirical evidence nevertheless suggests that awards are not as arbitrary, or 
lacking in equity, as is commonly believed.285 
Criticisms notwithstanding, awards for pain and suffering in personal 
injury cases are permitted in all fifty states, though as a result of “tort reform” 
efforts in the 1990s and thereafter, the amount of such awards is often capped 
by statute.286 In other countries, courts sometimes employ schedules that 
correlate the amount of the award for pain and suffering with the severity of the 
 
to provide a better mix of incentives and insurance (all things considered) than any other number that might be 
used, then that is the measure of damages that ought to be awarded,” whereas “from the standpoint of corrective 
justice, it apparently is crucial to pick a number that does correspond to some standard measure of value of some 
asset or entitlement. Only then can the resulting damage award plausibly be described as compensating for a 
particular loss”). 
 281. See Jaffe, supra note 6, at 224 (arguing, however, that consolation is “most valid for disfigurements or 
loss of member giving rise to a continuing sense of injury”); Zavos, supra note 1, passim (arguing that 
noneconomic damages provide a symbolic atonement for a wrong). 
 282. See Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and 
Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 282–91 (2003) (arguing further that 
damages for pain and suffering turn emotions into commodities); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, 
Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 163, 163–96 (2004) (rejecting further 
the arguments that pain and suffering damages provide consolation or are justified because they enable victims 
to substitute other pleasures). 
 283. See King, supra note 282, at 190. On a related note, some law and economics scholarship has argued 
that the fact that private insurance generally does not compensate for pain and suffering indicates that there is a 
lack of consumer demand for such compensation, ex ante, and that pain and suffering awards therefore are 
economically inefficient. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical 
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362–67 (1988); King, supra note 282, at 184 (reviewing other literature on this 
issue). For scholarship disputing this argument on a variety of grounds, including the likely imperfection of 
insurance markets, see, for example, Avraham, supra note 280; Croley & Hanson, supra note 9; Geistfeld, supra 
note 29. 
 284. See Ingber, supra note 3, at 803; Jaffe, supra note 6, at 224; King, supra note 282, at 175–76, 197, 199. 
 285. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 280, at 117–18 (arguing that “observed horizontal inequity might not 
reflect a real problem,” in part because “individuals who appear to suffer a similar injury do not experience the 
same degree of pain and suffering”); Geistfeld, supra note 29, at 783–85 (“The system currently achieves some 
degree of vertical equity but fails to achieve horizontal equity because jurors are told to consider the severity of 
injury in calculating the award but are then given no guidance on how to translate injury severity into an 
appropriate monetary amount.”). 
 286. See generally PRIMERUS, A STATE BY STATE UPDATE OF TORT REFORM (2013), 
https://www.primerus.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/YLS-2012-2013-State-by-State-Update-on-Tort-
Reform.pdf (listing damage caps for pain and suffering). 
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injury, which helps to reduce vertical and horizontal inequity.287 To date, 
however, there appears to be little appetite for following suit in the United 
States—perhaps, as Stephen Sugarman suggests, “because of our cultural 
commitment to individual juries doing what they see as individual justice to 
individual victims personally before them in the courtroom,”288 or as Mark 
Geistfeld argues, because legislatures have concluded (correctly) that the 
variability of potential injuries is so large that it resists standardization.289  
B. APPLYING THESE PRINCIPLES TO IP LAW: HARM TO REPUTATION OR 
GOODWILL  
Following the framework set forth above, a good place to begin the analysis 
is to consider whether any of the relevant bodies of IP law are specifically 
intended to protect against either reputational or emotional harm. As discussed 
in Part II, at least three of them—the law of trademark infringement, the privacy-
based right of publicity, and moral rights in copyright—do appear intended to 
protect against some harms to reputation or goodwill.290 Indeed, in each of these 
bodies of law, economic damages may, to some extent, compensate for 
reputational harms. An act of trademark infringement, for example, could result 
in quantifiable lost profits precisely because it has sullied the owner’s reputation, 
and therefore caused the owner to lose sales.291 The question for present 
purposes is whether the rightsholder should recover something more, when there 
is reason to believe that the infringement has caused reputational harm extending 
beyond the owner’s provable economic damages.  
The debate over pain and suffering damages in tort law suggests some 
considerations that may be relevant to this analysis. First, while quantification 
problems present one of the principal critiques of pain and suffering awards, 
such problems may be of lesser moment when the question is how to estimate 
injury to a business entity’s goodwill or reputation. Corporate financial 
statements, where available, can be used to estimate the value of the victim’s 
 
 287. See, e.g., MUNDHENKE, supra note 262, at 36; Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: 
Thinking About Pain and Suffering Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 379, 388–89 (2006); Stephen D. 
Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 427 (2006). 
 288. Sugarman, supra note 287, at 433. 
 289. See Geistfeld, supra note 29, at 792–93 (noting that “[t]o the extent that certain types of injury currently 
receive more or less compensation than they should relative to other injury types,” such vertical inequity “would 
be sustained by reforms that rely on prior awards to determine the appropriateness of future awards,” and further 
that “the appropriate pain-and-suffering award in an individual case . . . will often depend upon a variety of 
factors that may be difficult to standardize”). But see Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance 
in the Determination of Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 10–12 
(2017) (arguing that comparable-case guidance, as distinguished from predetermined damages schedules, can 
improve both predictability and accuracy); Hillel J. Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case 
Guidance on Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled 
Trial, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 455–58 (2019) (reporting evidence from a randomized controlled trial that 
comparable-case guidance improves accuracy). 
 290. See supra notes 99–103, 111–118, 153–170, 199–203 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 131–136 and accompanying text. 
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goodwill before and after the infringement; and while some of this decline may 
be attributable to other factors, the quantifiable change in the value of goodwill 
should provide a meaningful cap on recovery.292 In addition, unlike damages for 
pain and suffering, damages that enable the victim to carry out a corrective 
advertising campaign can (in theory) restore the victim to its position ex ante—
though in practice, as we have seen, the damages courts actually have awarded 
for corrective advertising often have seemed arbitrary.293 For violations of 
publicity and moral rights, by contrast, damages awards may do little to actually 
restore the victim’s reputation; and because the rightsholders are individuals, 
reputational harm may be less susceptible to rational quantification than in 
trademark cases (though not necessarily any less so than in, say, individual 
defamation cases).  
A second consideration is whether refusing to award reputational damages 
would leave plaintiffs without any effective remedy. As above, economic 
damages may carry at least some of the weight, and in addition courts can enjoin 
the defendant from continuing its wrongful conduct. In publicity and moral 
rights cases in particular, however, these alternatives may provide little comfort. 
An injunction ordering the defendant to restore an artifact to its original 
condition, after all, will not be feasible if the work has been destroyed or 
irremediably altered; and in both contexts, there often may be no provable 
economic harm (such as lost profits or reasonable royalties).294 Refusing to 
award reputational damages in these bodies of law therefore risks leaving the 
plaintiff with no effective remedy, despite the importance of reputational 
interests to both of them.295  
 
 292. See supra notes 132, 136 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 294. Though conceivably, a court could award a non-celebrity right of publicity plaintiff a reasonable 
royalty for the fair market value of, say, the services of a similar-looking professional model. 
 295. Alternatively, however, there is some risk that awarding damages for reputational (or emotional) harm 
might enable plaintiffs to circumvent some of the limitations imposed by the law of defamation or infliction of 
emotional distress, and thus undermine the balance obtained in those other legal regimes. A possible 
compromising solution would be to allow “parasitic” claims for reputational or emotional harm, which would 
be available only if the plaintiff succeeds in first proving some amount of economic harm. See supra note 68 
and accompanying text (discussing parasitic claims for emotional distress in defamation law). But this still might 
leave some otherwise successful plaintiffs without any effective remedy. 
  On a somewhat related note, for purposes of defamation law the United States and other common law 
countries generally take the position that a person has no legally protectable interest against being defamed post-
mortem. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (AM. L. INST. 1977). In some countries or under 
some circumstances, however, moral rights laws continue to apply post-mortem. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106A(d)(2); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West 2020). To be sure, the distortion of an author’s work post-
mortem may affect her ongoing literary or artistic reputation; or a violation may cause her heirs to suffer some 
degree of emotional distress. Nevertheless, if the right itself is personal to the author, it’s not clear what the 
appropriate compensatory damages (if any) would be for a post-mortem violation. For discussion, see 
McCutcheon, supra note 260, at 286 (arguing that, in such cases, the harm is principally to the social interest in 
art preservation, and that the optimal legal response would be to permit a claim on behalf of the public). To the 
extent moral rights laws—in particular, U.S. moral rights laws—are intended, in part, to vindicate the public 
interest in art preservation, damages based on the decreased market value of a work resulting from the 
defendant’s misconduct would to some extent vindicate this interest, albeit in an attenuated fashion if the direct 
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For patent and (non-moral rights) copyright infringement, the balance is a 
little different. On the one hand, as in trademark infringement cases, it may be 
roughly feasible to quantify the reputational harm resulting from the defendant’s 
misconduct, where the plaintiff is a corporate entity or otherwise has an 
established commercial reputation. On the other, the protection of reputation is 
not central to the purpose of either patents or copyrights, as it is to the other 
bodies of law discussed above.296 Moreover, while any departure from the 
principle of full compensation poses some risk, at least in theory, of undermining 
the incentive to invent or create works of authorship, the fact that such awards 
are, and probably will continue to be, rare,297 suggests that, ex ante, any such 
effect is likely to be small, if it exists at all. Further, as in trademark cases (and 
in contrast to some moral rights cases), injunctive relief can play a meaningful 
role in preventing any future reputational harm to the patent or copyright owner, 
even if it cannot erase past injuries. The question of whether courts should ever 
award damages for reputational harm in patent or copyright cases therefore may 
hinge on, among other things, the difficulty of quantifying such harm, as 
discussed in Subpart D below.  
C. APPLYING THESE PRINCIPLES TO IP LAW: EMOTIONAL HARM  
The merits of awarding damages for emotional harm also would appear to 
vary somewhat, depending on who is asserting the rights and which body of IP 
law is at issue. As for the “who” question, as noted earlier courts in some 
countries, under some circumstances, might permit a corporation or a deceased 
author’s heirs to recover damages for moral prejudice.298 U.S. courts, by 
contrast, almost surely would reject claims for emotional distress brought by or 
on behalf of non-human or deceased entities,299 even if such claims would be 
available to living humans, and I will not argue against that point here.  
Whether these claims should be available to living, natural persons for the 
infringement of some (or all) forms of IP, however, may present a closer 
question. The argument would seem strongest in publicity and moral rights 
cases. As we have seen, the right of publicity is (in part) an aspect of the common 
law of privacy; and since the interest at the core of this right is that of not being 
thrust, unwillingly, into the limelight, it is not uncommon for courts to award 
 
beneficiary is the author or her heirs, and not the general public. In some cases, such awards also might reduce 
the quantification problems discussed in Part III.D, since they would not be aimed at compensating the injury to 
the author’s honor or reputation—though not in cases such as Castillo, where the artworks had no clear market 
value. See Castillo v. G&M Realty, L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020).  
 296. Nevertheless, it doesn’t appear that allowing such awards would necessarily undermine any core 
purposes of patent or copyright law either, though awards for emotional harm might. See infra notes 306–318 
and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 186, 248 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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general damages for violations that cause emotional distress.300 (Indeed, as with 
reputational harm, there often may be no economic damages.) Similarly, the 
principal justification for moral rights is that the work of authorship embodies 
the author’s unique personality, such that the distortion or misattribution of the 
work in some sense causes an injury to that personality.301 At the very least, then, 
one could say that such awards would not be inconsistent with the purposes of 
these laws. As with damages for pain and suffering, however, the question 
remains whether courts can value these injuries in a manner that is predictable 
and non-arbitrary, a topic I return to below.302  
As for other forms of IP, in a recent article Ronen Avraham argues that it 
would make sense to allow courts to award damages for emotional harm in at 
least some patent infringement cases.303 To make his case, Avraham cites the 
severe emotional toil suffered by Philo Farnsworth (inventor of an early 
prototype of television) and Robert Kearns (inventor of the intermittent 
windshield wiper), when, respectively, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 
and Ford forced them to undertake years of costly litigation to vindicate their 
rights.304 Drawing an analogy to pain and suffering damages in tort law, 
Avraham argues that the emotional harm these individuals suffered was both 
real and debilitating, and that defendants have little incentive to avoid causing 
such harm if courts cannot award appropriate damages.305 Presumably one could 
make similar arguments about individual authors and (perhaps) even individual 
trademark proprietors—though in the latter instance, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Lanham Act § 45 might rule out any such claim under federal 
trademark law, as a doctrinal matter.306 Moreover, as we have seen, E.U. law 
appears consistent with Avraham’s thesis that “moral prejudice” damages are 
available, where substantiated, for almost any violation of IP rights.307 
To analogize by way of antitrust law, however, I would argue that 
emotional harm is simply not the type of injury that patent (or trademark or, 
 
 300. See supra notes 159–170 and accompanying text. I would be surprised, however, if courts were to 
award special damages, such as compensation for therapists’ bills, for violations of the right of publicity or for 
moral rights violations. Although such damages may be a foreseeable consequence of certain other torts, such 
as intentional infliction of emotional distress, I suspect they would be excluded in the present context as being 
too speculative to satisfy proximate cause. 
 301. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral 
Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 971 (1990) (“In the case of moral rights, 
compensation is for injury to personality, as in the case of the dignitary torts such as injury to reputation, 
humiliation, and outrage . . . .”). To the extent one views the author’s investment of her personality into the work 
as the philosophical basis for copyright generally, however, and not just moral rights, see supra note 173, perhaps 
(contrary to my discussion in the text above) damages for emotional distress should be available in both contexts. 
 302. See infra Part III.D. In some cases, the First Amendment also may limit the plaintiff’s ability to recover 
damages for hurt feelings, which adds another complication. See supra notes 54–61, 81 and accompanying text 
(noting First Amendment limitations in the law of defamation and emotional distress). 
 303. See Avraham, supra note 20. 
 304. See id. at 215–16, 216 n.6. 
 305. See id. at 215–16, 222–23. 
 306. See supra note 128. 
 307. See supra Part II.F. 
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outside the moral rights context, copyright) laws are intended to prevent. As 
discussed in Part II, the dominant view within the United States is that patents 
and copyrights exist only for the purpose of encouraging inventors and authors 
to invest in creating and publishing inventions and works of authorship, from 
which the public stands to benefit.308 Trademarks primarily serve the utilitarian 
purpose of reducing consumer search costs and encouraging firms to invest in 
quality control.309 Taking these perspectives seriously suggests that inventors, 
authors, and trademark owners are simply a means to an end—the end being, in 
the case of patents and copyrights, the promotion of “Science and Useful 
Arts,”310 and in the case of trademarks, the reduction of consumer search costs. 
Put another way, taking inventor, author, or trademark owner feelings into 
account would subvert the purposes of these laws by turning these individuals 
into ends in themselves, rather than a means to an end.311 
To be sure, some commentators view patents (and other IP rights) through 
a less utilitarian lens. Rob Merges, for example, argues for a Kantian-based 
theory of IP rights, under which the institution of private property generally, and 
of intellectual property in particular, enables people “to expand their range of 
freedom—their autonomy,” that is, to “pursue the ends they set for 
themselves.”312 Further to this point, Merges argues that patents can “enhance 
the independence of highly skilled people who make a specialized technology 
input . . . to have more say over their work, more control over their professional 
fate—more autonomy”313—or, as I have previously described his thesis, 
“patents are not simply a means to the end of inducing invention, but also in 
significant measure a means for enabling individuals to realize their 
potential.”314 From this perspective, Avraham’s arguments in favor of awarding 
pain and suffering damages in some patent (and, by extension, copyright and 
trademark) cases might make sense, if some acts of infringement so debilitate 
the owner, emotionally, that she loses the ability to realize her potential.  
Nevertheless, unless we dispense with utilitarian considerations altogether, 
it seems doubtful that allowing damages of emotional harm would, on balance, 
be desirable. The first issue relates to error costs—in particular, the risk that 
 
 308. See supra notes 173, 234 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 311. See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and Intellectual Property Law, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES 
EIGENTUM/INTELL. PROP. J. 291, 298 (2015) (“[T]he conventional rationale for patents is that the state confers 
exclusive rights in inventions not because inventors have a moral entitlement to reap the fruit of their labor, but 
rather as a means to an end—indeed, of multiple ends, including the creation and disclosure of new inventions 
from which the public stands to benefit but that (due to free-rider problems) might not have been invented or 
disclosed in the absence of the patent incentive.”). I know, Kant must be spinning in his grave. See IMMANUEL 
KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 230 (Thomas E. Hill ed., Arnulf Zweig tr., Oxford 
University Press 2002) (1785) (“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”). 
 312. MERGES, supra note 173, at 70, 72. 
 313. Id. at 83. 
 314. COTTER, supra note 46, at 59. 
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natural human sympathy would lead courts and juries systemically to err in favor 
of granting such awards. If so, this would be problematic not only for the reasons 
discussed above in connection with pain and suffering (arbitrariness, ability to 
feign injury, and so on)—but also because, arguably, overcompensating IP 
owners is worse than undercompensating them, all other things being equal, 
given (1) how little empirical support there is for the proposition that patent and 
copyright incentives matter all that much, outside of a few select fields such as 
pharmaceuticals and motion pictures; and (2) the harm that overly broad IP 
rights can do to free speech and competition interests.315 Second, as with 
reputational harm, it seems unlikely that the ex ante knowledge that emotional 
harms will be compensated, should they arise, is material to the incentives that 
do drive inventors and creators in many fields.316 Third, if in the vast majority 
of cases courts would reject claims for emotional harm for lack of evidence or 
on proximate causation grounds, a rule disallowing such damages altogether 
would conserve administrative costs with relatively little offsetting loss.317 
Fourth, as Avraham himself notes, courts have other tools at their disposal, 
including the ability to award enhanced damages for willful infringement, which 
reduce the need for recognition of a separate award for pain and suffering.318 
In conclusion, awards of damages for emotional harm are most defensible 
for violations of the privacy-based right of publicity and of authors’ moral rights 
but arguably would be at cross-purposes with the rationales for other forms of 
IP protection. To the extent one believes that awarding damages for reputational 
and/or emotional harm would serve the public interest in at least some IP 
contexts, however, the question remains how best to accomplish that purpose 
given the difficulty of quantifying these injuries. In the section that follows, I 
present a few options.   
D. THE MEASURABILITY PROBLEM 
In the preceding two Subparts, I argued that there are good reasons for 
allowing courts to award damages for harm to reputation or goodwill in 
trademark, right of publicity, and moral rights cases, and a plausible (but not 
airtight) argument for doing so in copyright and patent actions. In addition, I 
argued that it might make sense to award damages for emotional harm in some 
 
 315. See id. at 49, 272 (discussing the empirical evidence on the patent incentive); Christopher Jon 
Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (and Don’t), 55 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 457 (2017) 
(stating, on the basis of current empirical studies, that “the link between copyright and creative incentives is 
considerably less robust than theory may have led us to expect”). 
 316. See supra text accompanying note 297 (“[T]he fact that such awards are, and probably will continue to 
be rare, suggests that, ex ante, any such effect is likely to be small, if it exists at all.”). 
 317. See supra notes 271–278 and accompanying text (discussing proximate causation and the economic 
loss doctrine). 
 318. See Avraham, supra note 20, at 229–30. In addition, courts can award attorneys’ fees in exceptional 
cases, see 35 U.S.C. § 285; and have the inherent power to sanction litigant misconduct, see Octane Fitness, 
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 (2014). These remedies do not compensate for emotional 
harm, to be sure, but their availability may help to deter the type of conduct that concerns Avraham. 
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right of publicity and moral rights cases, but not in other types of IP cases. I also 
have argued throughout, however, that the desirability of awarding noneconomic 
damages hinges in part on the difficulty of measuring them in some reasonably 
predictable, non-arbitrary manner. In this Subpart, I will review the options for 
providing monetary relief for the reputational or emotional harm surrounding an 
act of infringement. I will argue that none of them is perfect but that a few simple 
principles can serve as rational guideposts for setting damages in a manner that 
adequately vindicates owner interests and avoids undue risks of overdeterrence 
or other third-party harms.  
The first, and most obvious, option is to allow courts to award general 
damages for whichever noneconomic harms are cognizable within the body of 
law in suit. The principal drawback associated with this option is that general 
damages risk being arbitrary and unpredictable—which in turn makes it difficult 
to ensure that awards for similar or comparable injuries are similarly 
compensated, and poses some risk that the threat of excessive liability could 
over-deter lawful conduct.319 One possible response to these problems would be 
for legislatures (or agencies such as the Copyright Office) to develop some sort 
of damages schedule, analogous to those used in other countries for achieving 
consistency in regard to awards for pain and suffering.320 As noted above, 
however, to date the U.S. tort system has shunned the use of schedules, due in 
part to their perceived incompatibility with the jury system, as well as the 
difficulty of developing appropriate standards for comparing intangible 
injuries.321 This latter consideration in particular may weigh heavily in the 
present context, where the severity of the harm to reputation or psyche resulting 
from an act of infringement may vary considerably from one case to another.322  
A second option would be to award relief that is not primarily viewed as 
being compensatory in nature but which incidentally serves a potentially 
compensatory purpose. As discussed above, for example, courts sometimes 
award the defendant’s profits in a trademark infringement action to compensate 
for the intangible harm to the plaintiff’s reputation or goodwill, even though the 
primary purpose of the disgorgement remedy is to deter misconduct or prevent 
unjust enrichment.323 Statutory damages in copyright, and enhanced (or 
punitive) damages in the other bodies of IP law, could have a similar effect, even 
if (as with enhanced damages in patent law) the remedy is not intended to 
 
 319. See supra notes 63–64, 149, 283–284 and accompanying text. As also noted above, however, when the 
plaintiff is a corporate entity there will, at least, be a rational means for determining the limit beyond which 
damages for reputational harm should not stray. See supra text accompanying note 292. 
 320. See supra text accompanying notes 287–289. 
 321. See supra notes 288–289 and accompanying text. 
 322. Whether comparable case guidance would be an attractive alternative, notwithstanding such variability, 
might be worth considering in future work. Cf. Bavli, supra note 289, at 18, 20, 22 (arguing that comparable 
case guidance “is especially beneficial if claim variability,” that is, heterogeneity among cases, is low; but that, 
even in cases involving higher claim variability, the benefits may outweigh the costs). 
 323. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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compensate.324 In all of these examples, however, the relationship between the 
award and the severity of the noneconomic harm may be tenuous. In the case of 
disgorgement, the profit or other benefit the defendant derives from an act of 
infringement may be greater or less than the harm the plaintiff has suffered 
(assuming that the latter is, in principle, somehow commensurable in money). 
Further, although courts may consider the “revenue lost by the copyright holder” 
in determining the amount of statutory damages,325 there is no necessary 
relationship between this loss, or the overall amount of statutory damages 
awarded, and the owner’s noneconomic harm. Similarly, since enhanced 
damages are a multiple of the plaintiff’s proven actual damages, they might only 
haphazardly reflect the extent of the unquantified intangible harm. Thus, even if 
a court were to award the maximum statutory or enhanced damages allowed 
under applicable law, there’s no guarantee that that amount would adequately 
compensate for the harm to the plaintiff’s goodwill, reputation, honor, or mental 
state.326 (Raising the statutory maxima, or awarding enhancements in all cases 
as in, for example, antitrust327 and civil RICO328 cases, might alleviate this 
problem but would also substantially exacerbate the risk of overdeterrence.) 
Finally, to merit an award of enhanced damages in trademark or patent law, 
enhanced statutory damages in copyright law, or the infringer’s profits in 
trademark law, the plaintiff normally has been required to show that the 
infringement was willful329—a requirement that probably is justified in order to 
avoid over-deterring lawful conduct but that also limits the extent to which these 
remedies can indirectly compensate intangible harms.  
Even so, if one believes that courts should make some effort to remedy the 
IP owner’s noneconomic harm, these tools may be better than nothing; and on 
further reflection, some of the limitations of the second class of remedies may 
 
 324. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (2016) (noting that “[s]ome early 
decisions did suggest that enhanced damages might serve to compensate patentees as well as to punish 
infringers,” but that “[i]n the main . . . references to compensation concerned costs attendant to litigation,” a 
concern that “dissipated with the enactment in 1952 of 35 U.S.C. § 285,” which authorizes awards of attorneys’ 
fees in exceptional cases); cf. Avraham, supra note 20, at 230 (proposing that enhanced damages should 
indirectly compensate patent owners for pain and suffering). 
 325. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 171–72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020). 
 326. See Damich, supra note 301, at 971 (“The destruction of a painting of recognized stature would cause 
a loss considerably in excess of [the statutory maximum] if the injury bore any relation to the market value of 
the painting. Even if the market value of the work were modest, injury to honor and reputation might exceed this 
amount if the destroyed work were the artist’s most famous, or only, work.”) (footnote omitted). 
 327. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
 328. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 329. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (limiting statutory damages to $750 to $30,000 for each work infringed, in 
the absence of willful infringement); Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (stating that enhanced damages “should generally 
be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 49 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1995) (“Normally, proof of malice or willful disregard of the plaintiff’s 
rights is required. Statutes in several states permit the award of enhanced or punitive damages if the defendant 
‘knowingly’ infringes the plaintiff’s right of publicity.”). But see supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting 
the Supreme Court’s recent Romag Fasteners holding that willfulness is not an absolute precondition to an award 
of profits for trademark infringement). 
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be more features than bugs. In the following paragraphs, I explain my reasoning 
in the course of making five general recommendations for awarding 
noneconomic damages in IP cases.  
The first recommendation is that courts should be free to award general 
damages for acts of trademark infringement that cause harm to reputation or 
goodwill, and for violations of the right of publicity and of authors’ moral rights 
that cause either emotional harm or harm to reputation. This recommendation 
flows primarily from the fact that the protection of noneconomic interests is 
central to these three bodies of law, and that, standing alone, the alternatives 
discussed above (other than statutory damages for violations of VARA)330 risk 
leaving IP owners with no effective monetary relief.331 And at least in the context 
of trademark infringement cases brought by corporations, the company’s pre-
infringement net worth provides a meaningful upper limit on recovery.332   
Second, however, in the absence of willful or malicious infringement, the 
amount of such general damages should be presumptively modest,333 for two 
reasons. The first is that, as with other types of noneconomic damages such as 
pain and suffering, an award of damages for reputational or emotional harm does 
not, in any literal sense, restore the status quo, but rather is often more accurately 
conceived as a symbolic atonement for a wrong.334 If this is correct, then the 
amount of the award may be of lesser moment than the fact that some award, 
however symbolic, has been granted.335 Second, because “modest” damages 
 
 330. Recall that statutory damages may not be available for claims litigated under state moral rights laws, 
and that state laws may cover some subject matter not covered by VARA. See supra note 209 and accompanying 
text. 
 331. To be sure, subject to the principles of equity, courts could still issue injunctions to prevent future harm; 
and the ex ante prospect of being enjoined ex post, after having incurred substantial sunk costs, may provide 
some ex ante deterrent against infringement. See Norman V. Siebrasse, Rafal Sikorski, Jorge L. Contreras, 
Thomas F. Cotter, John Golden, Sang Jo Jong, Brian J. Love & David O. Taylor, Injunctive Relief, in PATENT 
REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 9, at 115, 117, 121. Still and 
all, in the absence of monetary relief, there is a risk that prospective defendants will not be adequately motivated 
to internalize some of the external harms that infringement can cause. 
 332. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 333. I will be the first to admit that the statement “damages should be modest” is vague. I’m just not sure 
that any clearer statement, in the absence of damages schedules, is feasible. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (exempting, 
from copyright notice requirements in place between January 1, 1978 and March 31, 1989, failure to include 
copyright notice on a “relatively small number of copies”). The precise amount would, in any event, be 
determined in light of the factors I recommend infra notes 340–344 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 281–283 and accompanying text. In trademark law, of course, the existence of 
economic damages that partly compensate for reputational harm (such as lost profits or corrective advertising) 
would leave only residual reputational harm to be remedied by an award of general damages. This residual harm 
would be capped by the owner’s pre-infringement net worth, as noted above, but the existence of the cap leaves 
open the question of how much any quantifiable decrease in net worth is attributable to the infringement, and 
how much to other factors. Thus, in the absence of willful infringement, there is still reason to worry that 
anything beyond modest general damages would present a substantial risk of overdeterrence of marginally lawful 
conduct. 
 335. This reasoning may well lay behind the fact that damages for moral prejudice in Europe often are 
merely nominal. See supra notes 258–260 and accompanying text. 
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necessarily would lie within a fairly small range of dollar amounts, they would 
be more predictable and less likely to risk over-deterring lawful behavior.336  
Third, notwithstanding the immediately preceding recommendation, courts 
should have the authority to grant more substantial noneconomic damages when 
the defendant has engaged in willful or malicious misconduct because, in such 
cases, there may be more need for symbolic atonement, and less need to be 
concerned about overdeterrence.337 Consistent with this recommendation, courts 
could either grant larger general damages in such cases, or incidentally protect 
the relevant interests of owners by awarding monetary relief in the form of the 
infringer’s profits, enhanced or punitive damages, or enhanced statutory 
damages conditioned on proof of willful infringement. Cases like Waits338 and 
Castillo339 fit within this class.  
Fourth, and relatedly, in deciding the amount of general, enhanced, or other 
damages to award, courts should consider factors that are relevant to the likely 
severity of the harm and the actual severity of the offense. Fortunately, the 
existing case law in the United States and elsewhere provides some useful 
guidance in this regard. As noted above, for example, the Second Circuit advises 
courts to consider, as the court in Castillo did, six factors in setting the amount 
of statutory damages in a copyright case, namely: 
(1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned, by 
the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent 
effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer’s cooperation in 
providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) 
the conduct and attitude of the parties.340 
 
 336. In this regard, it is important to note that, for most bodies of IP law, inadvertent or innocent conduct 
can constitute infringement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 
1995) (“Intent to deceive or confuse is not required for the imposition of liability” for trademark infringement); 
id. § 25 cmt. h (“The plaintiff in an antidilution action is not required to prove that the defendant intended to 
dilute or tarnish the trademark.”); id. § 46 cmt. e (“Unless required by an applicable statutory provision, an intent 
to infringe another’s right of publicity is not an element of liability.”); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict 
Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800–01, 801 n.7, 815 n.50 (2002) 
(noting that liability in patent law is strict, in the sense that it does not depend on knowledge or intent on the part 
of the defendant; and that liability in copyright hinges on copying, which however may be unconscious or 
inadvertent). Under VARA, however, violation of the moral right of integrity does require proof of intent or, in 
the case of destruction, gross negligence. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). Liability for trade secret misappropriation 
also is conditioned on a showing of either “improper means” or knowledge. See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
 337. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 
445 (1998). Indeed, in the absence of substantial damages, there may inadequate deterrence; or, to put it another 
way, defendants may not be so motivated to internalize the external consequences of their behavior, injunctive 
relief notwithstanding. 
 338. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); see discussion supra notes 162–168 and 
accompanying text. 
 339. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020), discussed 
supra notes 21–28, 221–231 and accompanying text. 
 340. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 172. But see Bracha & Syed, supra note 181, at 1238–48 (critiquing the optimal 
deterrence rationale); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 186, at 507 & n.335 (arguing that awarding statutory 
damages to deter “other infringers who are not parties” is inconsistent with due process, and that courts “should 
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In a similar vein, in the context of trademarks and unfair competition, the 
Eighth Circuit in Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.341 affirmed an award of 
general damages for harm to reputation by taking into account the importance 
of the plaintiff’s business reputation in the relevant market, the difficulty 
encountered by the plaintiff to regain it, and the benefit to the defendant of 
calling that reputation into question.342 German courts, moreover, consider 
factors such as “the ongoing significance of the infringement to the author and 
his reputation,” the need for deterrence, “the intention of the infringer, the scale 
of the infringement, the artistic standing of the work in question, and the 
existence of other means of undoing the harm,” in setting damages for moral 
prejudice or violation of the right of personality.343 Boiled down to the essentials, 
and restated to focus on noneconomic harms specifically, all three sources could 
be viewed as advising courts to consider (1) the likely severity of the harm, 
including the time, money, and effort incurred in response to it;344 (2) the benefit 
the defendant derived from the misconduct; (3) the defendant’s overall 
culpability; and (4) the perceived need to deter similar future conduct. Focusing 
on these factors will not, of course, remove all uncertainty or render awards 
entirely predictable; but it should channel the court’s or jury’s attention to the 
relevant aspects of the inquiry, and thus reduce the risk of substantial error.   
Fifth, in cases in which the protection of noneconomic interests would not, 
in principle, run contrary to the policies underlying the body of law at issue, but 
also is not central to those policies, measurement problems arguably counsel 
against any award of noneconomic damages, at least in the absence of willful 
infringement. (The relevant cases in this class would be patent and non-moral 
rights copyright infringement actions in which plaintiffs seek damages for 
reputational harm.) The reason for this recommendation is the concern that the 
potential availability of even modest noneconomic damages marginally raises 
adjudication costs and poses some risk, however slight, of overdeterrence, while 
the countervailing benefit of vindicating reputational harm is one that, as above, 
is not a core purpose of either body of law.345 When the infringement is willful 
or malicious, on the other hand, there may be (as above) less reason to be 
concerned about overdeterrence, and greater solicitude for any harm 
unnecessarily inflicted on the owner’s reputation. In fact, the law of trademark 
dilution already engages in a somewhat analogous calculus, insofar as it limits 
 
focus on what remedy would have deterred the defendant before the court”). As noted above, the Castillo 
defendants also argued in their certiorari petition that the damages award violated due process. See supra note 
28. 
 341. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 342. See id. at 1122–23. 
 343. See supra notes 261–263 and accompanying text. 
 344. To the extent these losses are adequately compensated through awards of actual damages, of course, 
they should be excluded here. 
 345. Cf. Heymann, supra note 3, at 1435–38 (arguing that, “disclaimers, retractions, and other forms of 
information correction” often may be more appropriate than monetary compensation for harm to reputation, 
given the “uneasy fit between monetary awards and various justifications for the legal protection of reputation”). 
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any damages recovery to cases of willful dilution, and otherwise relies 
exclusively on injunctive relief as the means for vindicating the owner’s 
interest.346 Furthermore, to the extent that real property analogies are persuasive, 
as we have seen courts generally limit awards of noneconomic damages for torts 
against real property to malicious or willful misconduct,347 following suit in 
patent and copyright cases would not be altogether unfamiliar. 
To sum up, there is a reasonable case that plaintiffs in trademark 
infringement, moral rights, and right of publicity actions should sometimes 
recover damages for the resulting noneconomic harm to their reputation or 
goodwill, and in the latter two types of cases for emotional harm as well. General 
damages can be one way of accomplishing this goal, as can, under appropriate 
circumstances, awards of statutory damages, defendant’s profits, or (perhaps) 
punitive or enhanced damages. Courts should presume, however, that any such 
damages are modest in the absence of willful or malicious misconduct, and 
should allow claims for reputational damages in patent and non-moral rights 
copyright matters only in such cases, if any. Moreover, when courts do award 
noneconomic damages, they should focus on a small set of relevant factors for 
guidance in setting the amount. Nevertheless, and even subject to the limitations 
laid out herein, there necessarily will be some degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability in the amount of noneconomic damages to be awarded in any 
given case; such risks can be reduced but not avoided, unless we eliminate 
noneconomic damages altogether.  
CONCLUSION 
Under current practice, U.S. courts sometimes allow IP owners to recover 
noneconomic damages for harm to their reputation or goodwill caused by an act 
of infringement, but they almost never award damages for emotional harm 
outside the right of publicity context. By contrast, courts in the E.U. are, to 
varying degrees, more open to the possibility of awarding damages for “moral 
prejudice” across the range of IP cases, including patent cases. 
In this Article, I have argued that the U.S. practice is, in general, preferable, 
but that emotional as well as reputational harm should be considered cognizable 
interests in cases involving violations of authors’ moral rights. In addition, I have 
proposed five recommendations for making future practice more predictable—
among them, allowing courts to award general damages for cognizable 
noneconomic harms in trademark, right of publicity, and moral rights cases, 
while also advising them to render only modest awards in the absence of willful 
or malicious infringement. Finally, I have proposed a set of factors, based on the 
Second Circuit’s recent Castillo case and other U.S. and non-U.S. sources, for 
setting the amount of these awards in future cases. Adopting these 
 
 346. See supra notes 119–125 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. Of course, in the real property arena these noneconomic 
damages are likely to be for emotional, not reputational, harm. 
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recommendations would assist courts and other decisionmakers in adequately 
vindicating important interests, while also rendering awards more predictable 
and certain.  
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